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OF GAMETES AND GUARDIANS: THE
IMPROPRIETY OF APPOINTING GUARDIANS
AD LITEM FOR FETUSES AND EMBRYOS
Susan Goldberg*
Abstract: Recent advances in medical technology have caused some commentators and
courts to perceive fetuses and embryos as separate entities, with rights independent of the
women who carry them. Conduct of pregnant women that has been perceived to conflict
with the interests of the fetuses they carry has been called into question. In some cases,
courts have been forced to determine the juridical status of fetuses and embryos; in others,
courts have appointed guardians ad litem to represent the "best interests" of these entities.
This Article maintains that appointing guardians ad litem for fetuses and embryos is inap-
propriate. Fetuses and embryos are not accorded the same status as existing persons
under constitutional law. Protecting such entities, which are completely dependent on the
women who carry them, violates the privacy rights of pregnant; women. Moreover,
existing child abuse legislation, under the auspices of which somecourts have appointed
guardians ad litem for fetuses, is not designed to operate in the in utero context. The
"geography of pregnancy" suggests that fetal interests should not be used to restrict the
right of pregnant women to enjoy privacy and bodily autonomy.
Legal conflicts between a woman and the fetus she carries were rela-
tively rare before the advent of sophisticated medical technology.'
Recent scientific advances, however, now allow us to observe the fetus
in utero, to test amniotic fluid and chorionic villus to determine
genetic defects and, in some cases, to provide therapy when problems
are discovered. At the same time, researchers have identified and doc-
umented the dangers of drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes and using
drugs during pregnancy. Physicians are now also able to assist infer-
tile couples through the use of in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafal-
lopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer and embryo freezing.
These new technologies permit the creation of extra-uterine embryos.
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A. 1980 Tufts
University, J.D. 1984, Georgetown University; L.L.M. 1986, Temple University. My thanks to
Bob Hayman, Bruce Kogan, Jon Krinick and Lynn Patrow for their comments on drafts of this
Article and to my research assistants past and present for their efforts: Laura Jean Hansen,
Eileen Grena, Maureen McGlynn, Chris Cosgrove and Ellen McHenry. In addition, many
thanks to Lynn Paltrow and the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project for putting me in touch
with ACLU branches coping with these cases and for keeping me informed of developments in
this area. I would also like to thank Lena Mooney, Rosemary Crosley and Velma Mastro for
their invaluable assistance. I dedicate this Article to those who inspired me to write it, Jon
Krinick and Layla Clare Goldnick.
1. Efforts to control women because their actions might affect the fetus predate the expansion
of medical technology. See eg., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The advent of
sophisticated medical technology has dramatized the potential for conflict.
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As a result of these developments, some courts have begun to per-
ceive a divergence of interests between woman and fetus. Problems
regarding the disposition of extra-uterine embryos have also recently
arisen. The legal status of these embryos is of enormous legal and
ethical concern. If embryos are accorded the legal status of juridical
persons, the next step courts may take is to appoint guardians ad litem
to represent the best interests of these embryos.
This Article examines the propriety of appointing guardians ad
litem for fetuses and embryos. This Article maintains that applying
traditional rules governing the appointment of guardians ad litem to
fetuses and embryos is inappropriate. Current legal theories do not
accord to the fetus or embryo the status and legal protections afforded
to children. Because a fetus is physically dependent upon and resides
within the woman carrying it, according such entities independent
legal rights threatens the privacy and autonomy of pregnant women.
Since guardians appointed to represent children are granted deferen-
tial treatment in representing the "best interests" of the child,
appointing guardians ad litem in these circumstances potentially trans-
forms pregnancy into a legally adversarial relationship between
woman and fetus. Ironically, it might also have the effect of driving
women away from health care which would benefit both woman and
fetus.
Part I of this Article outlines existing approaches to the appoint-
ment of guardians ad litem. First, it examines the issue with reference
to child abuse and neglect statutes; second, it examines the issue in the
context of appointments for incompetent individuals; lastly, it exam-
ines the issue in the trust context. Part II of the Article outlines the
role medical technology has played in encouraging physicians and
judges to view the fetus as an entity separate from the woman carrying
it. Part II also examines advances in infertility research which have
led to the creation of extra-uterine embryos and examines the impact
of our nation's drug war on the rights of pregnant women. Part III
provides a brief overview of the status of the fetus at common law;
Part IV discusses the right to privacy; Part V discusses recent cases in
which guardians ad litem have been appointed to represent fetal inter-
ests because of a perceived conflict between a woman's behavior and
the interests of the fetus; and Part VI discusses the impropriety of
appointing guardians ad litem in these cases. Finally, Part VII
explores the ramifications of grafting procedures used for appointing
guardians ad litem for children to fetuses and embryos.
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Guardians Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos
I. THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM
Traditionally, guardians ad litem are appointed to represent the
interests of individuals who are incompetent to represent themselves in
legal proceedings,2 and where a potential conflict exists between the
usual decisionmaker and the individual whose interests are at stake.
For example, a guardian ad litem may represent a child in abuse or
neglect proceedings, or in proceedings regarding the termination of
parental rights.' Courts may likewise appoint a guardian ad litem
when parents are deemed to be acting contrary to their children's
medical interests.' Guardians ad litem also represent the rights of
2. A guardian ad litem is appointed by the court "to prosecute or defend, in behalf of an
infant or incompetent, a suit to which he is a party, and such guardian is considered an officer of
the court to represent the interests of the infant or incompetent in the litigation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 635 (5th ed. 1979). The guardian ad litem is often appointed under a state's rules
of civil procedure, see Note, Guardians Ad Litem, 45 IOWA L. REV. 376, 376 n.4 (1960), or
under its probate codes and mental health codes, Solender, The Guardian Ad Litem: A Valuable
Representative or Illusory Safeguard?, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 619, 620 (1976). The use of a
guardian ad litem dates back to the Roman Empire. Id at 619. English common law required
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for children and incompetents. Id. at 620. Some states
adhere to the old view, requiring that the child be a party to the proceeding before appointing a
guardian ad litem. See Comment, Protecting the Interests of Children in Custody Proceedings" A
Perspective on Twenty Years of Theory and Practice in the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem,
12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 234, 234 n.6 (1978). For a discussion of circumstances in which the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for a child is appropriate, see generally Genden, Separate
Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial
Proceedings, 11 HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565 (1976) (juvenile proceedings, mental hospital
commitments, custody disputes, paternity suits, parens patriae actions to compel medical
treatment, or education).
The role of the guardian ad litem is distinguishable from the role of an advocate. The guardian
ad litem represents the best interests of the individual, regardless of the individual's preferences.
An advocate, on the other hand, is a proponent of the individual's point of view, regardless of the
advocate's own opinion of the propriety of the course of action. Unfortunately, the
nomenclature in this area is often muddled, and legislation may call for the appointment of a
guardian ad literri, but describe the role properly fulfilled by an advocate. In Maine, for example,
the guardian ad litem represents the best interests of the child, but must make known the wishes
of the child "regardless of the recommendation of the guardian ad litem." ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4005.1.B-.E (Supp. 1990).
3. Conflicts may arise due to accusations against the usual decisionmaker in abuse and neglect
cases. See Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role of the
Child Advocate in Child Abuse Cases, 23 VILL. L. REv. 521, 527-29 (1977-1978). Competing
financial interests may necessitate an appointment. See, eg., Cooper v. Liverman, 406 S.W.2d
927, 931 (rex. Civ. App. 1966). For a discussion of the use of guardians ad litem in divorce and
custody matters, see generally Levin, Guardian Ad Litem in a Family Court, 34 MD. L. REv. 341
(1974).
4. See infra notes 20-23 and accbmpanying text.
5. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
505
Washington Law Review Vol. 66:503, 1991
incompetents in medical treatment cases, 6 and the rights of incompe-
tents, minors and unborn generations in trust and estate dispositions.7
Courts derive authority to appoint guardians ad litem from statu-
tory provisions, procedural rules and their own inherent equity
power.' While the role of a guardian ad litem is often ill-defined, 9 the
typical standard requires the guardian to represent the "best interests"
of the incompetent individual."° The guardian ad litem is also fre-
quently considered an officer of the court. 1
A. Guardians Ad Litem for Children
Parents are generally viewed as the appropriate decisionmakers in
matters concerning the health and well-being of their children. 2 Our
legal system presumes that parents will act to protect their children's
6. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Whyte, 62 Md. 427, 433 (1884); Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 225
N.E.2d 866, 867 (1967); Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185, 191 (1965);
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 9-109, 13-501, 13-502 (1974). One
court indicated that inherent powers to appoint a guardian ad litem could be invoked whenever
"there are interests of a minor to be protected." Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417, 421, 238 A.2d 373,
376 (1968). Judge Levin, on the other hand, argues that while equity enables a judge to appoint a
guardian ad litem, statutory authorization is more appropriate. Levin, Guardian Ad Litem in a
Family Court, 34 MD. L. REv. 341, 364-65 (1974).
9. Solender, supra note 2, at 638.
10. Findlay v. Findlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). As Judge Levin postulates:
The function of the guardian ad litem would be to assist the trial judge in any proceedings
which may effect the children.... Thus the primary responsibility of the guardian ad litem
would be to accurately present the true needs of the child and, thereby establish the 'best
interest' test as a suitable formulation for ensuring a child's welfare.
Levin, supra note 8 at 362. Exactly what is in the best interests of the child may be open to
debate.
In a contested situation [the guardian ad litem] will be faced with at least three interpreta-
tions of this standard: the welfare agency's, the parents' or present custodians', and his own.
Even if his interpretation is the same as one of the others, it is not necessarily the right one
by virtue of some majority rule concept.
Solender, supra note 2 at 639. Additional interpretations may be held by the court, the child and
society. Calls have been made for more clearly defined guidelines to assist the guardian ad litem.
See, e.g., Comment, The Non-Lawyer Guardian Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceed-
ings: The King County, Washington, Experience, 58 WASH. L. REV. 853, 867-69 (1983).
11. Comment, supra note 2, at 253. As a result, the guardian ad litem may act as an arm of
the state, exercising the state's interests as parens patriae. See A. SUSSMAN & S. COHEN,
REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 54 (1975).
12. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents."); see Bowen v. American Hosp.
Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 n.13 (1986); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Parkham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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interests.13 Parental autonomy, however, is not absolute.14 The state,
as parens patriae, has an obligation to protect the welfare of children,
an obligation which may at times supersede parental authority.15 The
basis for the state's authority stems from its interest in protecting
those incapable of assuring their own welfare and in protecting societal
well-being. 6 Thus, the state will intervene when it perceives that a
parent has acted in a manner that contravenes the state's protective
obligations. 17 Because the parental responsibility is deemed primary,
courts generally will not appoint a guardian ad litem unless the threat
to the child is perceived to be substantial. 8 This principle is evident in
medical cases, for example, where courts have traditionally intervened
only where medical treatment was considered essential. 9
Federal and state statutes require the appointment of a guardian ad
litem in any judicial action involving suspected abuse or neglect. The
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 197420 (Child Abuse
Act) required each state to enact legislation providing for the appoint-
13. Parents now have what is viewed as a presumptive right to decide matters concerning
their children. Fraser, The Parent and the Child: A Delicate Balance of Power?, in CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT: THE COMMUNITY AND THE FAMILY (C. Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1976); Fraser,
Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian Ad Litem, 13
CAL. W.L. REV. 17, 26 (1976). Sometimes this perception is based on societal views of
appropriate parental actions rather than actions that present a real danger of injury to the child.
See generally, Hayman, Presumptions of Justice" Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent
103 HARV. L. REv. 1201 (1990).
14. Custody of Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836, 843 (1979):
[Tihe parental right to control a child's nurture is grounded not in any absolute property
right which can be enforced to the detriment of the child, but rather, is akin to a trust,
subject to a correlative duty to care for and protect the child, and terminable by the parents'
failure to discharge their obligations.
15. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156
Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
16. See, eg., Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants Their Parents, and the State, 5
FAM. L.Q. 63, 107 (1971); Note, A Case for Independent Counsel to Represent Children in
Custody Proceedings, 7 NEw ENG. L. REv. 351, 352 (1972).
17. See, eg., In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51; In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E. 2d
820, 823 (1955); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 680, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). In many of these
cases the courts use neglect theories to authorize state intervention. Richards v. Forrest, 278
Mass. 547, 180 N.E. 508, 510 (1932).
18. Cf Mariner, Glantz & Annas, Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perils of Prosecution, 9 CRIM.
JusT. ETHICS 30, 35 (1990) [hereinafter Mariner].
19. See, eg., In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d at 823; In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972);
In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1912). Some courts have expanded the inquiry in medical cases
and have intervened in less serious circumstances. See, eg., In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147
(Iowa 1972); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970).
20. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106
(1988)).
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ment of a guardian ad litem in abuse and neglect proceedings. 2' Fed-
eral funding for child abuse prevention programs was tied to the
state's enactment of these provisions.22 In 1984, Congress amended
the Act to provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in cases
where medical neglect or withholding of treatment had allegedly
occurred.23
B. Guardians Ad Litem in Trusts, Estates and Probate
The use of a guardian ad litem is prevalent in trust, estate and pro-
bate proceedings.24 Almost all states have statutes, court rules, or pro-
cedural statutes authorizing courts to appoint a guardian ad litem in
such proceedings to protect the interests of minors, incompetents,
unborn beneficiaries, persons unascertained and persons whose loca-
tion is unknown. In addition, courts have declared their inherent
authority to appoint such guardians.26
As is true in other contexts, the guardian ad litem's role in estate,
trust and probate proceedings is not clearly defined.2" Appointment is
21. The Act provides: "That in every case involving an abused or neglected child which
results in a judicial proceeding a guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the child in
such proceeding." Id. § 5203(b)(2)(G) (1988). State definitions of child abuse and neglect
generally include the infliction of physical or mental injury, including sexual abuse, neglect, or
maltreatment of a child. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103 (1987). For a discussion of
definitions, see Fraser, supra note 13, at 19-20 (1976). For examples of definitional variations in
the state statutes, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-30-103(3) (1987); IDAHO CODE
§ 1602(a)(l)-(2) (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68(1), (2)(a)-(2)(d) (West 1984); MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-701(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.110(l)(5) (1990);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3.M (Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740(1)(a)-(f)(1985); 11 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2203 (Purdon 1988).
In most states, a child is defined as "a person under the age of eighteen." See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-103-(4) (1987).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2). Many states already had statutes providing for the mandatory
appointment of guardians ad litem in abuse and neglect cases. Colorado was the first state to
require such appointments. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-10-8 (1963). The statute has since been
revised. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103 (1987).
23. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 122, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106(b)(10)(C)).
24. Begleiter, The Guardian Ad Litem in Estate Proceedings, 20 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 643,
644 (1984).
25. Id. at 645, 647 n.28.
26. Id. at 649. In Hatch v. Riggs National Bank the court stated:
Courts of justice as an incident of their jurisdiction have inherent power to appoint
guardians ad litem. The efficacy of a guardian ad litem appointed to protect the interests of
unborn persons is no different whether he be appointed pursuant to statute or the court's
inherent power. Given such protection, the equitable doctrine of representation embraces
the flexibility .... to act upon the interests of unborn contingent remaindermen to the same
effect as if they had been sui juris and parties.
361 F.2d 559, 565-66 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (citations omitted).
27. Begleiter, supra note 24, at 663.
Guardians Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos
made for the limited purpose of the litigation at hand.28 In many
respects the guardian ad litem acts as an attorney in advancing the
interests of the client.29 Some courts view the guardian ad litem as an
officer of the court, with the court retaining the primary obligation to
protect the incompetent.3 °
C. Guardians Ad Litem for Incompetents
Typically, medical treatment decisions concerning an incompetent
individual are made by family members; however, if no relatives are
available," if conflicts between family members exist, 32 or if family
members are perceived to be acting contrary to the best interests of the
incompetent, a guardian ad litem may be appointed.33 In such cases,
the guardian must be more than a mere advocate; often the guardian
ad litem is charged with objective fact finding and furthering the work
of the court.34
In termination of treatment cases, many courts originally required
the appointment of a guardian ad litem.35 Following the lead of the
28. Id. at 714-15.
29. In re Curley's Estate, 61 Misc. 391, 293 N.Y.S. 370, 378 (Sur. Ct. 1936); In re Schrier's
Will, 157 Misc. 310, 283 N.Y.S 233, 235 (Sur. Ct. 1935). But cf In re Estate of Roe, 65 Misc. 2d
143, 316 N.Y.S.2d 785, 789 (1970) (although a guardian ad litem acts as an attorney in many
respects, the guardian has a concurrent obligation to the court which an attorney does not have).
30. G. WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAw OF GUARDIANSHIP (1897); Begleiter, supra note 24,
at 715.
31. A guardian ad litem may be appointed when family members cannot be located. See, eg.,
In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433 (1977) (addressing the right of an
incompetent individual to refuse life-prolonging measures).
32. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1984) (when conflict of interest between
guardian and incompetent is alleged, guardian ad litem should be appointed).
33. See Model Statute, An Act to Revise the Methods, Criteria and Procedures for Protecting
Partially Disabled and Disabled Persons and Minors and the Property of Such Persons and
Minors; to Establish the Criteria for Appointing Limited Personal Guardians, Personal
Guardians, Limited Conservators and Conservators and Their Duties and Powers; and to Specify
the Rights of Individuals Subject to Intervention Proceedings and Dispositional Orders,
§ 34(5)(b), in SALES, POWELL, VAN DUIZEND & ASSOCIATES, DISABLED PERSONS AND THE
LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 601 (1982). The model statute also lays out the role of the
guardian ad litem. Id. at 599-601. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) allows for the
appointment of a next friend or guardian ad litem. 3A J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.26, at 17-210 (1987); see, eg., Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 634
F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1572 at 512 (2d ed. 1990).
34. See Begleiter, supra note 24, at 714-15.
35. See, eg., In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), modified, In re Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 738 (1984).
509
Washington Law Review
court in In re Quinlan,3 6 however, some courts have abandoned the
requirement of a guardian ad litem under some circumstances.37
II. MEDICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Prenatal Screening
The tendency to view the fetus as a separate person, with potentially
divergent interests from those of the woman carrying it, has received
impetus from recent advances in prenatal screening and treatment
procedures which increasingly enable doctors to ascertain, and some-
times even treat, fetal abnormalities. Some problems discoverable by
prenatal screening may be amenable to treatment while the fetus is still
in utero.3" Amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling (CVS), and
ultrasonagraphy are now commonly used when prenatal diagnosis is
considered medically necessary.39 Courts, responding to requests for
intervention by physicians, rely on medical testimony about the status
of the fetus and the available therapies." These technologies will be
surveyed briefly below.
CVS sampling, a first trimester prenatal diagnostic test designed to
identify genetic abnormalities, 4 ' has become widely available in the
past few years. 42 An ultrasound-guided catheter is used to obtain a
sample of chorionic tissue from the developing placenta.43 The early
timing of the CVS procedure is of great benefit to women seeking pre-
36. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
37. John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
38. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW 243-50 (1987).
39. Another diagnostic technique used prenatally is fetoscopy. Id. at 136-37.
40. See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612-13 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (1990).
41. CVS involves obtaining cells from the developing placenta (called the chorion) in order to
test for genetic abnormalities and chromosomal defects. Testing usually occurs between the
ninth and twelfth week of pregnancy. Rhoads, Jackson, Schlesselman, De La Cruz, Desnick,
Golbus, Ledbetter, Lubs, Mahoney, Pergament, Simpson, Carpenter, Elias, Ginsberg, Goldberg,
Hobbins, Lynch, Shiono, Wapner & Zachary, The Safety and Efficacy of Chorionic Villus
Sampling for Early Prenatal Diagnosis of Cytogenetic Abnormalities, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 609
(1989) [hereinafter Rhoads].
42. See Department of Obstetrics & Gynecology, Tietung Hosp. of Anshan Iron & Steel Co.,
Fetal Sex Prediction by Sex Chromatin of Chorionic Villi Cells During Early Pregnancy, I CHIN.
MED. J. (N.S.) 117 (1975) (Eng.). The first procedures were attempted only a few years ago.
Brambati & Simoni, Diagnosis of Fetal Trisomy 21 in First Trimester, I LANCET 586 (1983).
43. Because the chorionic tissue is derived from the fertilized egg, diagnosis is equally
accurate. Rhoads reported a 97.8% accuracy rate versus a rate of 99.4% for amniocentesis.
Rhoads, supra note 41, at 609.
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natal diagnosis. If chromosomal abnormalities are discerned, a first
trimester abortion can be performed.'
Amniocentesis is the retrieval of amniotic fluid via needle aspiration
under ultrasound guidance.4" Because the procedure requires a suffi-
cient amount of amniotic fluid for aspiration, the procedure is usually
not performed until the fifteenth or sixteenth week of pregnancy. 6
Fetal cells are then cultured to determine the presence of chromo-
somal abnormalities.4 7 Consequently, results may not be available
until the nineteenth week.4' Amniocentesis is nearly 100% accurate
in detecting chromosomal abnormalities.4 9
Ultrasonography utilizes high frequency soundwaves that transmit
echoes from density shifts.5 0 Although it has only been in use for two
decades, ultrasound has become very useful in identifying fetal abnor-
malities."1 The list of fetal abnormalities potentially identifiable by
ultrasound is extensive 52
B. Fetal Therapies
Most congenital abnormalities detectable through the use of prena-
tal screening are not yet amenable to corrective treatment. Some ther-
apies deemed to benefit the fetus do, however, exist, and can be
provided in utero via the woman. 53 These treatments include transfu-
44. Abortions during the second trimester entail greater maternal risk, expense and
psychological stress. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 38, at 131. It is interesting to note that in
1987, at the time the book was written, CVS was still an investigative procedure. Id.




48. See S. ELIAS & G. ANNAs, supra note 38, at 130; Hodge, Waiting for the Amniocentesis,
320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 63 (1989).
49. S. ELIAS & G. ANNA, supra note 38.
50. J.R. WILLSON & E.R. CARRINOTON, supra note 45, at 33.
51. S. ELIAS & G. ANNA, supra note 38, at 140-42; J.R. WILLSON & E.R. CARRINGTON,
supra note 45, at 149. The 1984 National Institute of Health Consensus Conference on
Diagnostic Ultrasound Imaging in Pregnancy decided that ultrasound should be used only for
"specific medical indication[s]." Consensus Conference, The Use of Diagnostic Ultrasound
Imaging During Pregnancy, 252 J. A.M.A. 669, 672 (1984). However, ultrasound use is
increasing "for a wide variety of obstetrical indications." Elias & Annas, Routine Prenatal
Genetic Screening, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1407, 1408 (1987).
52. See Sabbagha, Shiekb, Tamura, DelCompo, Simpson, Depp & Cerbie, Predictive Value,
Sensitivity, and Specificity of Ultrasonic Targeted Imaging for Fetal Anomalies in Gravid Women
at High Risk for Birth Defects, 152 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 822, 823 (1985).
However, the value of an ultrasound procedure is dependent upon the skill of the examiner and
the use of other tests. Id. at 827.
53. See generally S. ELIAS & G. ANNAs, supra note 38, 245-50; Goldberg, Medical Choices
During Pregnancy: Whose Decision Is It Anyway?, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 591, 606-07 (1989).
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sions,5 4 vitamin therapy for metabolic diseases," and glucocortoids to
mature fetal lung capacity when premature delivery is imminent.16
Fetal surgery in utero has also been attempted for hydrocephalus,57
urinary tract obstructions, 58 and diaphragmatic hernias. 9
C. Infertility Treatments
Technological advances in methods of assisting reproduction' have
provided hope for millions of infertile couples. 61 The use of in vitro
fertilization (IVF), gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) and zygote
intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), has led to an increase in the prevalence
of extra-uterine embryos. As with fetal therapies, these developments
have lent impetus to the notion that a fetus is a being with legally
protectable interests distinct from those of the woman carrying it. 62
IVF is typically recommended when the fallopian tubes are blocked
or missing, or when low sperm count has prevented conception in
utero.63 The IVF process typically involves hormonal stimulation and
subsequent retrieval of the oocytes just prior to ovulation. 64 If fertili-
54. See Raleigh Fitken-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
55. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 38, at 263-65.
56. Id. at 262.
57. Id. at 245-42; see also Depp, Sabbagha, Brown, Tamura & Reedy, Fetal Surgery for
Hydrocephalus: Successful in Utero Ventriculoamniotic Shunt for Dandy- Walker Syndrome, 61
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 710 (1983).
58. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 38, at 246-48.
59. Harrison, Adzick, Longaker, Goldberg, Rosen, Filly, Evans & Goldbus, Successful
Repair In Utero of a Fetal Diaphragmatic Hernia After Removal of Herniated Viscera From the
Left Thorax, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1582 (1990) (reporting successful in utero operation on
fetus afflicted with diaphramatic hernia, which is usually fatal).
60. Among the techniques commonly utilized by infertility clinics are artificial insemination
(commonly utilized when the male partner is infertile, if inheritance of a genetic defect is feared
or if there is no male partner), in vitro fertilization and gamete intrafallopian transfer.
61. Infertility is generally defined as the inability of a couple to conceive after 12 months of
intercourse. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL
AND SOCIAL CHOICES 35-36 (1988) [hereinafter OTA REPORT). The Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) reports that between two and three million married couples suffer from
infertility. Id. at 3. Among the causes of infertility are sexually transmitted diseases, delayed
childbearing, maternal infections and environmental toxins. Id. at 6-7. For a general discussion
of the causes of increasing requests for infertility assistance, see id. at 14.
62. See infra notes 137-81 and accompanying text.
63. Johnston, Lopata, Pepperell, Trounson & Wood, The Use of ln Vitro Fertilization in the
Infertile Couple, in THE INFERTILE COUPLE 263 (R.J. Pepperell, B. Hudson & C. Wood eds.
1987) [hereinafter Johnston].
64. Id. at 281.
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zation occurs, the resultant embryos are reinserted into the uterine
cavity.6
5
In contrast to IVF, GIFT does not involve fertilization ex utero.6
After hormonal stimulation of the ovaries to produce oocytes, retrieval
is accomplished via the same methods utilized for IVF. 67 The use of
GIFT procedures has become widespread in the last five years, with
over one hundred infertility clinics reporting the availability of the
GIFT procedure. 68  GIFT appears to have a higher rate of success
than IVF.
69
ZIFT is a variation on the GIFT procedure; fertilization occurs in
the laboratory and the zygote(s) are reinserted in the fallopian tubes.7'
The ZIFT procedure was first reported in 1988.71
The process of cryopreservation, which has been used in conjunc-
tion with infertility treatments, permits the freezing of excess embryos
for use during future cycles. 72 Pregnancy rates from cryopreserved
65. OTA REPORT, supra note 61, at 123. The success rate for in vitro fertilization varies
considerably depending on the clinic, but averages about 16%. Medical Research Int'l & the
Soe'y for Assisted Reproductive Technology, The American Fertility Society, In Vitro
Fertilization-Embryo Transfer in the United States: 1988 Results From the IVF-ET Registry, 53
FERTILrrY & STERILrrY 13, 16 (1990) [hereinafter Medical Research Int'l].
66. OTA REPORT, supra note 61, at 141.
67. Id at 123-24.
68. Id. GIFT and IVF are often used in tandem. The GIFT procedure is implemented first,
then extra oocytes are fertilized in vitro and cryopreserved for later usi. Johnstonsupra note 63,
at 264. While the GIFT procedure avoids some problems of extra-corporeal embryos, OTA
REPORT, supra note 61, at 255, problems may still exist depending on labels applied to when life
begins. See, eg., Davis v. Davis, 15 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989),
rev'd, No. 180, slip. op. 6. (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
69. Asch, Balmacedo, Ellsworth & Wong, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT). A New
Treatmentfor Infertility, 30 Ir'L J. FERTILITY 41 (1988); Molloy,.Speirs, DuPlessis, Gellert,
Bourne & Johnston, The Establishment of a Successful Programme of Gamete Intra-Fallopian
Transfer (GIFT) Preliminary Results, 26 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OBSTETRics & GYNECOLOGY 206
(1986) (reporting success rates of 29.4%). The higher success rate is probably due to conditions
in the fallopian tubes. Johnston, supra note 63, at 287-88.
70. Variations in this procedure include pronuclear stage tubal transfer (PROST), tubal
embryo transfer (TEl') and tubal pre-embryo transfer (TPET). Medical Research Int'l, supra
note 65 at 17.
71. In 1988, only 20 clinics reported using the ZIFT procedure. Id. at 18.
72. Gardts, Roziers, Campo & Noto, Survival and Pregnancy Outcome After Ultrarapid
Freezing of Human Embryos, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 469 (1990); Testart, Lassalle, Forman,
Gazengel, Belaisch-Allart, Hayout, Raingorn & Frydman, Factors Influencing the Success Rate
of Human Embryo Freezing in an In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer Program, 48
FERTILITY & STERILITY 107-12 (1987) [hereinafter Testart]; Trounson, Preservation of Human
Eggs and Embryos, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1 (1986); Trounson & Mohr, Human Pregnancy
Following Cryopreservation, Thawing and Transfer of an Eight-cell Embryo, 305 NATURE 707
(1983).
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embryos are similar to those using fresh embryos.7 3 The process may
reduce or eliminate the need for additional surgery each time a cycle
of IVF, GIFT, or ZIFT is initiated.74 In addition, the risk of multiple
gestations is reduced if excess embryos are cryopreserved rather than
re-implanted.75 Studies show that more than one cycle is typically
pursued by infertile couples; cryopreservation can hold surgeries and
associated physical, emotional and financial costs to a minimum by
providing eggs for additional cycles without additional surgeries. 6
The first human pregnancy from a cryopreserved embryo was
reported in 1983. 7 7 Two years later, the first birth occurred. 8 Since
that time, freezing embryos has rapidly become standard practice at
many infertility centers.79
Cryopreservation has certain drawbacks. The legality of pre-proce-
dure consent forms and disposition agreements specifying what is to be
done with the frozen embryos should the couple die, divorce, adopt,
change their minds, want to change programs, or fail to pay freezing
73. Fugger reported a pregnancy rate average of 13.4% per transfer and 15% per embryo for
frozen embryos. Fugger, Clinical Status of Human Embryo Cryopreservation in the United States
of America, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 986, 988 (1989). Rates for fresh embryo transfer vary
depending on the clinic but the average success rate with IVF is 16%. Medical Research Int'l,
supra note 65 at 19.
74. Testart, supra note 72, at 107-12.
75. OTA REPORT, supra note 61, at 128, 298.
76. Id. at 298; Trounson & Mohr, supra note 72, at 709. Additional perceived benefits
include allowing preservation of embryos for couples who risk loss of ovarian function because of
illness and allowing genetic diagnosis of potential defects prior to reimplantation. See Trounson,
supra note 72, at 9-10.
77. Trounson & Mohr, supra note 72. The first successful cryopreservation was performed
with rabbit embryos in 1947. Chang, Normal Development of Fertilized Rabbit Ova Stored at
Low Temperature for Several Days, 159 NATURE 602 (1947).
78. Fugger, supra note 73, at 986 (citing Mohr, Trounson & Freeman, Deep-freezing and
Transfer of Human Embryos, 2 J. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 1 (1985)).
79. In a survey conducted in early 1987, Bonnicksen and Blank determined that 41% of
eighty-eight responding IVF programs used cryopreservation; other respondents planned to
begin using it within two years. Bonnicksen & Blank, The Government and In Vitro Fertilization
(IVF): Views of IVF Directors, 49 FERTILITY & STERILITY 396-98 (1988). Between 1985 and
1986, the number of frozen embryos stored in the United States nearly tripled, rising from from
289 to 824. Bonnicksen, Embryo Freezing: Ethical Issues in the Clinical Setting, 18 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 26 (1988). By 1988, the number of frozen embryos topped 9,000, with more than
1,000 frozen embryos used to attempt impregnation. Medical Research Int'l, supra note 65, at
18. Three years after the first birth from a cryopreserved embryo, the American Fertility Society
announced that cryopreservation was now an established therapeutic procedure. Fugger, supra
note 73, at 986.
514
Guardians Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos
fees remains unsettled."0 In these cases a guardian ad litem may be
appointed to represent the "best interests of the embryo." '
D. Drug Use During Pregnancy
Recent medical studies have focused on the dangers of drug use dur-
ing pregnancy. Public sensitivity to drug use has increased as the war
on drugs has become a national priority. 2 One focal point of atten-
tion has been drug use during pregnancy. 3 Studies documenting the
detrimental effects of drug and alcohol use during pregnancy8 4 now
supplement the growing literature on the dangers of substance abuse.5
The use of illicit drugs, alcohol and other substances during pregnancy
can have a variety of negative effects on developing fetuses, including
80. See Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd,
No. 108, slip op. 6 (renn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (court asked to determine the disposition of
frozen embryos upon the couple's divorce); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(court asked to determine whether a couple could force transfer of frozen embryos from one
infertility clinic to another); see also Jones, Cryopreservation and Its Problems, 53 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 780 (1990). For a discussion of the Davis case, see Robertson, Resolving Disputes over
Frozen Embryos, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7 (1989).
81. See, e-g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131 (West Supp. 1990) ("In disputes arising between
any parties regarding the in vitro fertilized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such
disputes is to be in the best interests of the in vitro fertilized ovum.") It would appear necessary
under this standard to appoint several guardians to ensure that the separate juridical entity of
each frozen or fresh embryo is represented, because the embryos may have competing interests in
being selected for implantation.
82. Doemer, Flames of Anger, Washington Heats Up Its War Against Drugs South of the
Border, TIME, Jan. 18, 1988, at 28; Duffy, Fighting The Drug War from the Trenches, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., Sept. 8, 1986, at 20; Duffy, Drugs: Now Prime Time, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 11, 1986, at 16; Taylor, Uncovering New Truths About the Country's No. 1 Menace,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 28, 1986, at 50; Battle Strategies; Five Fronts in a War of
Attrition, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 69; Lichtblau & Shaw, Crack It's Not Just a City Drug, Los
Angeles Times, April 5, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
83. A recent study of women in Florida reported a 14.8% positive toxicological response in
screening for alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, or opiates. Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, The
Prevalence of Illicit Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory
Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED 1202 (1990) [herinafter Chasnoff].
84. See, eg.,'E. ABEL, FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME AND FETAL ALCOHOL EFFECTS (1984);
H. ROSETr & L. WEINER, ALCOHOL AND THE FETus 6 (1984); Chasnoff, Griffith, MacGregor,
Dirkes & Bums, Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 261 J. A.M.A. 1741 (1989)
[hereinafter Temporal Patterns]; Chasnoff, supra note 83; Chavez, Mulinare & Cordero,
Maternal Cocaine Use During Early Pregnancy as a Risk Factor for Congenital Urogenital
Anomalies, 262 J. A.M.A. 795 (1989) [hereinafter Chavez]; Zuckerman, Frank, Hingson, Amaro,
Levenson, Kayne, Parker, Vinci, Aboagye, Fried, Cabral, Timperi & Bauchner, Effects of
Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 762 (1989).
85. Cregler & Mark, Medical Complications of Cocaine Abuse, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1495
(1986); Isner, Estes & Thompson, Acute Cardiac Events Temporally Related to Cocaine Abuse,
315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1438 (1986); Jonsson, O'Meara & Young, Acute Cocaine Poisoning:
Importance of Treating Seizures and Acidosis, 75 AM. J. MED. 1061 (1983).
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reduced birth weight,16 intrauterine growth retardation, 7 abruptio
placenta," urinary tract defects," reduced head circumference,90 and
the birth of addicted newborns who suffer from withdrawal.9" The
evidence suggests that these infants may suffer from a lifetime of
impairments, particularly when drugs are used during the formatively
critical first trimester.92 Heavy alcohol use has been shown to cause
growth retardation, depression of the central nervous system develop-
ment and facial abnormalities.93 In addition, cigarette smoking has
been associated with increased risk of premature delivery and low
birth weight.9 4 Some prescription and non-prescription drugs, from
aspirin to tetracycline, may also have deleterious effects on the fetus. 95
III. STATUS OF THE FETUS AT COMMON LAW
Although courts have recognized limited causes of action involving
fetuses, courts have not gone so far as to give fetuses the legal status of
persons. Traditionally, a fetus has not had legal rights separate from
those of the woman who bears the fetus.96 Although some courts
accorded the fetus limited protectable interests, fetuses have not
86. Temporal Patterns, supra note 84, at 1743.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Chavez, supra note 84, at 785.
90. Temporal Patterns, supra note 84, at 1743.
91. Id. at 1744.
92. Id. at 1743; Chavez, supra note 84, at 795.
93. H. RosErr & L. WEINER, supra note 84, at 6. For a discussion of prenatal hazards, see
Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards: Whose Crimes? What Punishment?, 9 CRIM.
JusT. ETHIcS 13, 14-16 (1990). Nolan includes drugs, cigarette smoking, exposure to carbon
monoxide and lead, alcohol consumption, genetic conditions, infectious diseases, treatment
refusals and inadequate prenatal care among the in utero hazards to which fetuses may be
exposed during gestation.
94. Shino, Klebanoff & Rhoads, Smoking and Drinking During Pregnancy: Their Effects on
Preterm Birth, 255 J. A.M.A. 82, 84 (1986).
95. Tetracycline used during pregnancy can cause discoloration of the enamel on the teeth.
See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981). Aspirin may injure the
fetus. A. GU-rIMACHER, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND FAMILY PLANNING 78 (1986). DES and
thalidomide are examples of prescription drugs later found to be dangerous to the fetus. Recent
cases suggest that ingestion of DES during pregnancy may also have caused increased rates of
rare cancers in the offspring of children born to women who used DES. See Marcotte, DES
Legacy, 76 A.B.A. J. 14, 14 (1990).
96. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986) [hereinafter Women's Rights!
Fetal Rights]. In Roe v. Wade, the Court stated that "the unborn have never been recognized in
the law as persons in the whole sense" and, therefore, the fetus is not to be accorded the status of
a person. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). As a result, legal rights will not be conveyed
"except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live
birth." Id. at 161.
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enjoyed the legal status of personhood. Interests ostensibly accorded
to the fetus were frequently a means of protecting the rights of existing
persons. For inheritance purposes, a life in being was deemed to exist
from the moment of conception.97 The actual right to inherit, how-
ever, was contingent upon live birth.98 This legal fiction was designed
to promote the presumed intentions of the testator and to limit the
harsh application of the rule against perpetuities, not to confer legal
status upon the fetus.99
Likewise, the criminal law has not historically afforded the same
protections to the fetus as to existing individuals. 1°° At common law,
killing a fetus was not murder; indeed, even after viability, causing the
death of a fetus was only considered a misdemeanor.'0 Only if the
fetus was born alive and subsequently died of injuries sustained in
utero could murder be charged. 102 Some states have altered the com-
mon law by statute to include unlawful feticide as a murder.10 3
In the civil law context, although courts have gradually begun to
reverse the traditional rule against allowing recovery for torts against
fetuses, this has not amounted to a recognition of the fetus as a juridi-
cal person. As was the case with the criminal law, civil law did not
traditionally view a fetus as a person separate from the woman; there-
fore, it did not contemplate recovery for tortious conduct that injured
a fetus."° Gradually, however, courts began to recognize causes of
action for injuries sustained by a fetus after viability if the fetus was
later born alive.'0 5 Some courts have extended tort liability to injuries
sustained by a fetus prior to viability when the tortious conduct is
97. "An infant... in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many purposes. It
is capable of having a legacy... [i]t may have a guardian assigned to it, and it is enabled to have
an estate limited to its use .... 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130.
98. Id.
99. See Baron, The Concept of Person in the Law, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL,
LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 128 (M. Shaw & E. Doudera eds. 1983); see also UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1969); Women's Rights/Fetal Rights, supra note 96, at 601.
100. See State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876).
101. Note, Maternal Liability: Courts Strive to Keep Doors Open to Fetal Protection-But Can
They Succeed?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 747, 749 (1987).
102. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 140 (2d ed. 1969).
103. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060(b)
(1989).
104. See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (holding that no cause
of action for prenatal injuries existed because the fetus was not an entity separate from the
woman).
105. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (cause of action for fetal injuries
sustained post-viability recognized for later live born child); W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed.
1984). [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
Washington Law Review
committed by a party other than the woman.10 6 One court has even
allowed recovery by the child for tortious conduct committed by the
woman during pregnancy. 0 7 One state supreme court, however,
refused to extend liability to include tortious conduct by the pregnant
woman, reasoning that a distinction should be drawn between acts by
third parties that harm the fetus and acts by the pregnant woman her-
self.108 The Illinois Supreme Court has aptly explained, "No other
plaintiff depends exclusively on any other defendant for everything
necessary for life itself. No other defendant must go through biologi-
cal changes of the most profound type, possibly at the risk of her own
life, in order to bring forth an adversary into the world. 1 °09 The court
reasoned that "the imposition of such an obligation would improperly
curtail the privacy and autonomy of the pregnant woman, while the
imposition of obligations on a third party furthers the interests of both
the woman and the fetus."110
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, allowing recovery for tor-
tious conduct that harms the fetus is not tantamount to recognizing
and conferring legal status upon the fetus. 11 Suits have been allowed
on the basis of the loss suffered by the parents, or the child if it is
subsequently born alive, not because the fetus has the legal rights of a
juridical person. 12
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Matters concerning family rights, including procreation and the
decision to have a child, have been viewed as governed by the constitu-
tional rights of privacy and liberty. " 3 Thus, governmental actions
106. See Note, Unborn Child: Can You Be Protected?, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 286 n.9
(1988) (citing Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal
Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 331-32 (1984)).
107. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980) (pregnant woman's use
of tetracycline during pregnancy caused her child to have discolored teeth).
108. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
109. 531 N.E.2d at 360.
110. Id.
111. See Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 40-41 (1987); Women's Rights/Fetal Rights, supra note 96, at 600-01.
112. Goldberg, supra note 52, at 601; Women's Rights/Fetal Rights, supra note 96, at 601-02.
113. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couple to use
contraception). In Griswold, Justice Douglas found the right of privacy emanated from
penumbras of the Constitution, id. at 481-84, while Justice Goldberg's concurrence grounded the
privacy right on the "concept of liberty." Id. at 486; see also City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The right to privacy is deemed to emanate from the first,
fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. But see Bowers v.
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interfering with such decisions are subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 1"
The governmental objective must serve a necessary and compelling
state interest and the intrusion must be narrow to satisfy constitutional
requirements.' 1 5
A series of cases has provided the framework for understanding the
privacy right. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 6 the Supreme Court struck
down a statute providing for the sterilization of persons involved in
two or more "felonies involving moral turpitude," '117 declaring that
the right to reproduce was "one of the basic civil rights of man."11 In
Griswold v. Connecticut, 119 the Supreme Court held that the right of
married couples to use contraceptives falls within "the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 12 The
right to use contraceptives was extended to unmarried individuals in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 121 in which Justice Douglas wrote if "the right of
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Supreme Court refused to find constitutional
protection for homosexual activity. Id Precedent covering prior privacy decisions was
"dismissed in two brisk paragraphs as having no relevance to this issue, because those cases
involved rights related to 'family, marriage or procreation."' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1422 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191). "The dissenters in
Bowers described the relevant privacy interests as those relating to 'certain decisions that are
properly for the individual to make.'" L. TRIBE, supra at 1425 n.34 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at
204 (dissenting opinion)) (emphasis in original). Tribe notes that the right to privacy "is
something of a misnomer: what is truly implicated in the decision whether to abort or to give
birth is not privacy, but autonomy." Id. at 1352. In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't ofHealth, 110
S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring clear and convincing
proof of an incompetent's wishes in order to allow removal of artificial nutrition and hydration
from a person in a persistent vegetative state. Id at 2851-54. While the majority assumed a
liberty interest in an individual's right to refuse treatment, the state's interests in preserving life
had to be balanced against the rights of the individual. Id. at 2852. Placing the risk of error on
those seeking to terminate treatment was deemed an acceptable legislative choice. See id. at
2854. The dissent, however, viewed the Missouri statute as impermissably infringing on the
incompetent's fundamental right to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 2867-70 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). While the right of privacy of a competent adult to refuse treatment was presumed by
the majority, the high standard of proof required to enforce the right of an incompetent
individual to refuse treatment seems to limit the privacy rights of incompetents by balancing
them against state interests. It remains to be seen whether the Cruzan decision heralds a
contraction of fundamental rights and a corresponding increase in state interests.
114. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
115. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
116. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
117. Id. at 541.
118. Id Tribe notes that the Court was in part motivated to establish reproductive autonomy
as a fundamental right "because of fear about the invidious and potentially genocidal way in
which governmental control over reproductive matters might be exercised if the choice of
whether or when to beget a child were transferred from the individual to the state." L. TRIBE,
supra note 113, at 1339.
119. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. Id. at 485.
121. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child." '122
In Roe v. Wade,' 23 the Supreme Court established that privacy
rights protected the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy. 124
Roe established a trimester framework for evaluating state interests. , 25
Prior to viability, states lack a compelling interest in protecting poten-
tial life; therefore, they can only proscribe abortion after viability. 26
Even then, states cannot prohibit abortions which are necessary to
protect the life or health of the woman. 127  Health has been broadly
defined to include psychological, familial and emotional factors. 28
The doctrine enunciated in Roe has not been overturned, although its
continuing vitality is presently uncertain because of Justice Souter's
addition to the court, 29 and because the decisions following Roe have
refused to extend the case's reasoning to a variety of abortion
statutes. 130
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, '' the plurality rejected
the Roe trimester framework as inappropriate, stating it made "consti-
122. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. Id. at 153.
125. Id. at 163-64. The State's interest in protecting maternal health justified regulating the
abortion procedure during the second trimester, but there was no compelling State interest
justifying intervention during the first trimester. Id. at 149, 163-64. In the third trimester, the
state can regulate in the interests of maternal health and potential viability of the fetus.
126. Id. at 163-64. For a general discussion of the state's interests, see Rush, Prenatal
Caretaking: Limits of State Intervention With and Without Roe, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 55 (1987).
127. No trade-offs between a woman's health and the state's interest in protecting potential
life are permissible. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 769 (1986).
128. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
129. Until Justice Brennan's recent resignation, a plurality attempting to vote in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation restricting abortion rights has had to take Justice O'Connor's
position into account. While Justice Scalia has repeatedly criticised and called for Roe to be
reexamined, see Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring), Justice O'Connor has stated
that governmental regulation becomes unacceptable if it "unduly burdens the right to seek an
abortion." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2950-51 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring), the lack of a judicial bypass procedure was deemed unacceptable by
Justice O'Connor, indicating that for the time being the Supreme Court will continue to
recognize a fundamental right to abortion. The effect of the newest addition to the Supreme
Court remains to be seen.
130. See, e.g., Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052-58; see also Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2930-31.
131. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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tutional law in this area a virtual procrustean bed."1" 2 According to
the plurality, state interest in protecting potential life exists through-
out pregnancy; the arbitrary demarcation of trimesters is therefore
inappropriate.
133
Currently, the constitutional right to privacy includes a conditional
-freedom to make decisions relating to the termination of a pregnancy.
The right to privacy, however, is not limited to the abortion context.
The right was first defined in the field of family autonomy,134 and it
has been identified in individual autonomy contexts outside the scope
of traditional family relationships. 135  The doctrine remains a viable,
albeit less than invincible, means of protecting certain personal deci-
sions from government intervention. 1
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V. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL OR A GUARDIAN AD
LITEM TO REPRESENT A FETUS
Typically, cases in which guardians ad litem have been sought or
appointed have been of three types: abortion cases, forced medical
treatment cases and cases involving allegations of substance abuse dur-
ing pregnancy.1 37 In the earliest cases concerning the appointment of
fetal guardians ad litem, intervenors sought to initiate proceedings on
behalf of fetuses, challenging a woman's right to obtain an abortion.
31
132. Id. at 3056. Because Justice O'Connor ultimately found the provisions at issue in
Webster to be consistent with Roe, the Roe framework has not yet been altered.
133. Id. at 3057.
134. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
135. See, eg., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
136. See, eg., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
137. It is difficult to ascertain with certainty the number of cases in which a guardian ad litem
has been appointed for a fetus. Cases often go unreported, are not appealed, or are settled. In
addition, many criminal cases go unreported, are not appealed, or are settled because charges are
dropped, dismissed, or otherwise altered. See L. Paltrow, H. Fox & E. Goetz, ACLU
Memorandum: State by State Case Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women
and Appendix of Public Health and Public Interest Groups Opposed to These Prosecutions
(April 20, 1990) (on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter ACLU Memorandum];
State v. Gethers, No. 89-4454 CF10A (Fla. Cir. Ct. November 6, 1989), summarized in ACLU
Memorandum, supra, at 4 (charges against woman who allegedly took drugs during pregnancy
dismissed; court held fetus was not a person for purposes of the child abuse statute); Michigan v.
Cox, No. 9053545FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed January 30, 1990), summarized in ACLU
Memorandum, supra, at 7 (charges of child abuse and delivery of drugs during pregnancy
dropped but charge alleging delivery of drugs after birth but prior to cutting of umbilical cord
retained); see also In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (1990)
(guardian ad litem sought to force terminally ill woman to submit to a cesarian section).
138. See Brief of Amici Curiae Minors and Abortion Providers in Support of Respondent
T.W. at 6-7, Boylston v. T.W., 109 S. Ct. 2095 (No. A-903) (1989) (on file with the Washington
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Courts have denied such motions, primarily because the intervenor
seeking to become a guardian ad litem lacked standing.' 39 The guard-
ian ad litem lacked standing because standing is derived from the sta-
tus of the represented party, and the fetus is not a person for
fourteenth amendment purposes.' 4
In a second group of cases, courts have appointed guardians ad
litem to implement court-ordered medical treatment beneficial to the
fetus or woman over the objections of the woman.14 The develop-
ment of fetal therapies has raised the question whether these therapies
should be mandated when the woman objects to them. Technological
advancements in assessing the medical needs of the fetus have already
given rise to court-ordered cesarians.' 42 Although lower courts often
grant court orders to perform cesarians over the objections of pregnant
women,143 the only two appellate court decisions addressing the mat-
ter reach opposite conclusions.'" As a result of advances in prenatal
imaging, diagnosis and therapy, physicians may have to decide
whether the fetus is a separate patient. "When medical problems
arise, the physician must decide who the patient is, what treatment, if
any, should be implemented, and what the ramifications of such treat-
ment will be on the 'other' patient." '45
Law Review) (hereinafter T.W. Brief]. As examples, the T.W. Brief cites Woe v. Bear, No.
H-79-1866 (S.D. Tex. May 5, 1980); Roe v. Casey, No. 78-2214 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 1978);
Margaret S. v. Edwards, No. 78-2765 (E.D. La. Oct. 2, 1978) (order denying motion to
intervene); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, No. 178-155A (N.D. Ohio
May 16, 1978) (order denying motion to intervene in relevant part) (subsequent history on merits
omitted); Zbaraz v. Quern, No. 77-C-4522 (N.D. 111. May 15, 1978) (subsequent history on
merits omitted). T.W. Brief, supra, at 6-7.
139. T.W. Brief, supra note 138, at 7 n.9 (identifying Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S. 924 (1973),
vacated, Nassau County Medical Center v. Klein, 412 U.S. 925, as an example).
140. T.W. Brief, supra note 138, at 6-7.
141. See infra notes 146-60 and accompanying text.
142. See Gallagher, supra note 11, at 9; Goldberg, supra note 53, at 609; Kolder, Gallagher
& Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987)
[hereinafter Kolder]; Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL
MED. 333 (1982); Women's Rights/Fetal Rights, supra note 96, at 599.
143. See, e.g., In re Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233, col. 3 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1986). Many of the cases are unreported, but have been described in medical and legal literature.
See, e.g., 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209 (1981).
144. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (1990) (while the trial
court ordered the cesarian and the first appellate court decision upheld the order, a rehearing en
banc led to a reversal); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Ass'n, 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d
457 (1981) (ordering the woman to submit to a cesarian if she appeared at the hospital). For a
discussion of In re A.C., see Goldberg, supra note 53, at 614-18. As of this time, no court has
been asked to compel a woman to submit to prenatal testing or therapy. If obligations to the
fetus become legally enforceable, however, such orders could become commonplace.
145. Goldberg, supra note 53, at 591. For a discussion of the problem of defining maternal-
fetal issues in terms of "other"-ness, see Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and
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Courts have routinely appointed representatives" in compelled
medical treatment cases, with little discussion of the rationale behind
such appointments. In Raleigh Fitken-Paul Memorial Hospital v.
Anderson, 147 the court appointed a "special guardian" for an "infant"
when a pregnant woman refused blood transfusions deemed necessary
to save her and her fetus.14 In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County
Hospital, 14 9 the court granted a motion by the Department of Human
Resources for temporary custody of the fetus, and ordered the woman
to submit to a cesarian section. The court based its appointment of
counsel for the fetus at least in part on the premise that "this child is a
viable human being and entitled to the protection of the Juvenile
Court Code of Georgia."1' 0 A similar approach was taken by a trial
court in Massachusetts in Taft v. Taft,"'1 where a husband sought to
compel his wife to have a cerclage in order to prevent a miscarriage.1 5 2
The trial court judge appointed a guardian ad litem to represent "the
unborn child." '153 The guardian agreed with the husband's stance that
the cerclage should be performed.'54 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts rejected the contention that in this case the state had
interests compelling enough to "justify curtailing the wife's constitu-
tional rights."1 5  The court did not, however, explicitly rule out the
appointment of guardians in future cases under different facts.
A New York court dispensed with "the usual formalities of the
assignment of counsel [because of] the danger of imminent death," and
ordered a transfusion for a woman who was eighteen weeks preg-
State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1325, 1326 (1990) (arguing that by
characterizing the issue as one of competing rights, "the current debate has obscured the range of
conditions contributing to the problem, such as the lack of available prenatal care and treatment
programs for pregnant addicts"). The Note also argues that the focus should be on the needs of
the woman and the fetus, which do not always conflict. Id at 1341-43.
146. The designation given the representative has varied from "guardian ad litem" to "special
guardian" or "special counsel." Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 537 N.E.2d 721 (Ohio App.
1988) (guardian ad litem); In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (1990)
(counsel).
147. 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
148. The court reasoned that the "unborn child is entitled to the law's protection." Id at
538. Notably, however, the case was decided prior to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which
established a woman's right to privacy in matters concerning abortion and childbearing.
149. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
150. Id. at 459.
151. 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
152. A cerclage consists of suturing the cervix to prevent spontaneous miscarriage.
153. Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 395.
154. Id. at 396.
155. Id. at 397.
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nant. t5 6 The judge appointed a physician as special guardian for the
fetus and empowered him to use his medical judgment to act on behalf
of the fetus, including the power to order the woman to submit to a
blood transfusion. 1
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In the case of In re Madyun, 158 a guardian ad litem was appointed
to represent a full term fetus in an action to compel a woman in labor
to have a cesarian section because she refused to have the surgery.
The court also appointed counsel to represent the fetus in the widely
publicized case of In re A. C., 159 where a cesarian section was ordered
despite the fact that the woman objected to the surgery. 16°
A number of cases concerning drug abuse by pregnant women also
raise the issue of the appointment of a representative for the fetus.
Most of the cases involved interpretation of whether, for the purposes
of the state's child welfare or child abuse act, the fetus was equivalent
to a child. If so, the court would have jurisdiction to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem pursuant to the requirements of the statute. If not, the
court would lack jurisdiction and could not appoint a guardian.
Courts have split in their resolution of this issue. In In re Smith, 161
the court determined that an unborn child is a "person" entitled to
156. In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
Exigencies of time frequently result in an abrogation of the pregnant woman's rights. In one
case, a hospital petitioned for emergency protective services to compel the transfer of a pregnant
woman in premature labor based on "a fiduciary capacity for the unborn fetus." Petition For
Emergency Protective Services at 2, In re Waiters & Unborn Fetus, No. 52658 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan.
12, 1990). The woman was in premature labor and did not want to be transferred to a hospital
some distance from her home and small son. No counsel was appointed for the woman until
after the court granted the petition and the hospital transferred Ms. Walters to the second
facility. The court granted the petition despite the fact that it found Walters to be a competent
adult, because in its view, "balancing the consent rights of Tawanda Walters with the medical
care needs of her unborn fetus compel this decision." Order Granting Emergency Protective
Services at 2, In re Walters & Unborn Fetus, No. 52658 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 1990). The court
used a compelling state interest test, finding that the "emergency protective services are the least
restrictive alternatives available under the circumstances and do not cause physical harm to
Tawanda Walters." Id.
157. In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
158. 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233, col. 3 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986).
159. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (1990).
160. Barbara Mishkin, counsel for the fetus, did not view herself as a guardian ad litem, but
rather as an "attorney to represent the interests of the fetus," and to implement A.C.'s previously
expressed wishes. Conversation with Barbara Mishkin (June 12, 1990). However, the opinion
indicates that she had argued that the state had the responsibility to perform a cesarian in order
to protect the life of the fetus even if A.C. did not wish to have a cesarian performed. In re A.C.,
573 A.2d at 1238.
161. 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334-35 (Fam. Ct. 1985), appeal granted, In re
Sebastian M., 559 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1990). But see In re Fletcher, 141 Misc. 2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d
241 (Fam. Ct. 1988) (finding prenatal substance abuse could not be the basis for finding of child
abuse or neglect), appeal granted, In re Sebastian M., 559 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1990).
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protection under the state's family court act. Although the question
whether to appoint a fetal guardian ad litem did not arise because the
child had already been born, the court's rationale would have given it
jurisdiction to make such an appointment for a fetus.162 A similar
situation arose in In re Ruiz. 163  The child abuse statute in Ohio
defines a child as "a person who is under the age of eighteen years." '
The court broadly construed the definition to include a viable unborn
fetus. 165 Consequently, had the case come before the court while the
pregnancy was ongoing, the court could have appointed a guardian ad
litem for the fetus.
The case of Harnum v. Harnum 166 presents the issue in a slightly
different context. As part of a divorce and custody action, an ex parte
motion was submitted on behalf of an "unborn child" to compel a
pregnant woman to enter a detoxification program.167 The court
appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of an existing
child and "to the extent possible the interests of the yet unborn
child." 16
8
A New Jersey case, in dicta, suggests that a guardian ad litem may
be appointed in cases involving a viable fetus. 169 However, in In re
D.K, the court held that prior to viability, the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the fetus is improper. 7' The woman in that case
was only eight to ten weeks pregnant when the guardian was
appointed. According to the court, the appointment of a guardian in
the first trimester was inappropriate because it would "permit a third
party to control the fetus, contrary to Roe v. Wade." '171 In addition,
the court noted that the New Jersey Rules provide for appointment of
a guardian ad litem for a "minor," and, in the court's view, a fetus did
not qualify. 17
2
162. In re Smith, 482 N.Y.S. 2d at 335. Because the child was held to fall within the act's
jurisdictional definition of a "person," a guardian ad item could have been appointed under the
act.
163. 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (C.P. 1986). But af Cox v. Court of Common
Pleas, 42 Ohio App. 3d 171, 537 N.E.2d 721 (1988).
164. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 936.
165. Id. at 938.




169. In re D.K., 204 N.J. Super. 205, 497 A.2d 1298 (1985).





The case of In re Dittrick Infant 173 raised the issue of whether child
abuse and neglect provisions should apply to a fetus. The probate
court issued an order giving the Department of Social Services tempo-
rary custody over the "child" forty-five days prior to birth.174 The
Court of Appeals found that the probate court lacked jurisdiction over
the unborn child and, therefore, the appointment of the guardian was
improper.75
California courts reached the same conclusion in Reyes v. Superior
Court 176 and In re Steven S 177 In In re Steven S., the juvenile court
ordered that a fetus be "detained" pursuant to court rules until the
adjudication of a dependent child petition. 78 The juvenile court
found that California dependency provisions extended to cover the
fetus. On appeal, the court found that the legislature did not intend
the term "person" to include an unborn fetus; therefore, the juvenile
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the initial dependent child petition. 79
An Ohio juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem for a fetus in
a dependency and neglect action.18° Although the court said that the
issue of whether the fetus was a person under the statute was not
before it, the court found that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction
over the pregnant woman, and could not compel her to take action for
the benefit of the fetus.181
In sum, courts have been inconsistent when addressing the issue of
appointing guardians ad litem for fetuses. Efforts by intervenors to
have fetal guardians ad litem appointed in abortion cases have failed
because the courts have held the fetus is not a person. In forced medi-
cal treatment cases, some courts have appointed guardians ad litem
without adequately considering the propriety of the appointment. In
prosecutions of drug-abusing pregnant women under state criminal
173. 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977).
174. Id. at 38.
175. Id. at 39.
176. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
177. 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981).
178. Id. at 526.
179. Id. at 528.
180. Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 42 Ohio App. 3d 171, 537 N.E.2d 721 (1988).
181. Other state courts have agreed that their child neglect statutes did not apply to fetuses.
See ACLU Memorandum, supra note 137, at 4 (citing Florida v. Gethers, No. 89-4454 CF 10A
(Fla. Cir. Ct. November 6, 1989)); see also State v. Osmus, 73 Wyo. 183, 276 P.2d 469 (1954).
But see ACLU Memorandum, supra note 137, at II (citing State v. Pfannensteel, No. 1-90-8 CR
(Laramie County Ct., Wyo. filed January 5, 1990)). If the pregnant woman was herself a
juvenile, the court would have jurisdiction over her person, and could order her to act in ways
which would have a secondary beneficial effect on the fetus; but the authority of the court would
be to protect the interests of the juvenile and not the fetus. See Cox, 537 N.E.2d at 725.
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and child abuse provisions, guardians ad litem have recently been
appointed to represent the defendant's fetus. In some jurisdictions, the
courts have actually explicitly addressed the propriety of such an
appointment. Whether the guardian ad litem was appointed hinged
on whether the court viewed the fetus as a person under state law.
VI. THE IMPROPRIETY OF APPOINTING FETAL
GUARDIANS AD LITEM UNDER CURRENT LAW
The right to privacy and autonomy in medical decisionmaking is
not absolute; however, to intervene the state must show not only a
compelling interest, but must also narrowly tailor the means used to
protect that interest."8 2 In examining the asserted state interest in the
context of abortion regulations, the Supreme Court recently declined
to adopt a general test, choosing instead to decide on a narrow basis
whether a particular state statute is properly tailored to meet the
asserted state interest."8 3 In the context of forced medical treatment
and the application of child abuse and neglect provisions against preg-
nant women, it is virtually impossible for the state to meet these
requirements. While "promoting healthy pregnancies and healthy
babies" ' 4 is a laudable goal, pursuing this goal through the use of
guardians ad litem imposes unacceptably intrusive regulations on the
conduct of pregnant women. 185 Improving neonatal health is impor-
182. See supra notes 113-36 and accompanying text. In the most recent abortion cases, the
court appeared to apply this level of protection only upon a finding that the regulation unduly
burdened the procreative autonomy rights. If the regulation chilled the exercise of autonomy
rights, it would receive heightened scrutiny. See, eg., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926
(1990).
183., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). For a general discussion
of instances where the court refused to find a state's interest compelling, see Johnsen, From
Driving to Drugs Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA.
L. REv. 179, 205-07 (1989).
184. Johnsen, supra note 183, at 205.
185. The appointment of a guardian ad litem may create an adversarial climate when, in the
vast majority of cases, pregnant women make decisions that are in their own and their fetus's best
interest. See Pollitt, 'Fetal Rights'" A New Assault on Feminism, THE NATION, March 26, 1990,
at 409. Pollitt attributes the increasingly acceptable view that fetuses need protection from the
women who bear them to the following factors: societal frustration at our inability to control the
drug crisis, an unwillingness to devote the necessary resources to the crisis, technological
advances and the anti-choice movement. "In its various aspects 'fetal rights' attacks virtually all
the gains of the women's movement. Forced medical treatment attacks women's increased
control over pregnancy and delivery by putting doctors back in the driver's seat, with judges to
back them up." Id. at 416. According to Pollitt, the interest in fetal rights is in part a politically
motivated attempt to appear to be addressing the problem while in fact leaving many of the
difficult issues unresolved. Id. at 410-14.
Cases in which women do act contrary to what they perceive to be the best interests of their
fetuses are not amenable to judicial intervention. Identifying these cases is difficult, if not
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tant, but it does not justify governmental attempts to control pregnant
women which surpass in scope and duration regulations affecting per-
sons other than pregnant women.
186
Despite important state objectives, appointing guardians ad litem
for fetuses and embryos fails to meet strict scrutiny standards because
it is virtually impossible for states to tailor their regulations narrowly
enough to satisfy constitutional requirements. First, in order to pro-
tect a fetus the state would have to preclude pregnant women from
acting as autonomous adults for the duration of their pregnancies. 87
Second, even apart from women's privacy rights, imposing regulations
to reduce some risks might create greater hazards.1 88 As one author
has stated, "The important goal of promoting healthy pregnancies and
healthy babies is far better served by recognizing the commonalities of
interest between pregnant women and the government in accomplish-
ing this goal, rather than by artificially creating legal conflicts between
the pregnant women and the fetuses they carry." 189
A. Medical Treatment Cases
In forced medical treatment cases, it is inappropriate to balance the
rights of a competent, objecting woman with the perceived "interests"
impossible, and ascertaining motivation is neither feasible nor productive. Judicial intervention
is likely to force women underground, either causing some of them to seek abortions they would
not otherwise have had, or to avoid medical care. See Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect
the Fetus, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 114, 121 (1989); Mariner, supra note 18, at 37.
186. Johnsen, supra note 183, at 205-06 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co., 448
U.S. 469 (1989)).
187. Regulations could affect women who are not even pregnant, because some conduct, such
as exposure to lead and other environmental hazards, could be detrimental to a later-conceived
fetus. See Mariner, supra note 18, at 40 n.37. In addition, allegations that a pregnant woman's
use of DES later resulted in injury to a granddaughter were raised in Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. 58933 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 22, 1990), summarized in 58 U.S.L.W. 2584 (April 10, 1990).
188. See Mariner, supra note 18, at 40 n.37. Mariner et al. note the paucity of drug treatment
programs for pregnant women. They fear that regulating the conduct of pregnant women will
deter women from seeking prenatal care, which is a cause of developmental problems in fetuses.
Id. at 36-37; see also Missing Links: Coordinating Federal Drug Policy for Women, Infants and
Children: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1989) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (opening statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl); Paltrow, When
Becoming Pregnant is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 44 (1990).
189. Johnsen, supra note 183, at 207.
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of a fetus.' 90 Under Roe v. Wade, 1 the fetus is not a person; there-
fore, prior to viability, its interests cannot outweigh those of the
woman. Although Webster v. Reproductive Health Services'92 indi-
cates that a state's compelling interest in protecting human life may
arise before viability, the state's interest in limiting abortions may not
threaten a woman's life or health. By analogy, states likewise should
not be granted the power, before viability, to impair the autonomy of
pregnant women. Appointing guardians ad litem prior to viability is
inconsistent with privacy and liberty doctrines, and appointing such
guardians after viability is ineffective and inconsistent with principles
of bodily autonomy and self-determination. Much of the maternal
conduct that may be injurious to a developing fetus occurs during the
first trimester, when a woman may not even be aware that she is
pregnant.1 93
Webster involved state regulation of the availability of abortion, not
the imposition by the state of an obligation to take affirmative action
on behalf of the fetus.194 Affirmative obligations that involve bodily
intrusions of the parent are currently not imposed on parents to benefit
existing children; it is therefore inappropriate to impose such obliga-
tions on behalf of a fetus. 19 Even assuming arguendo that a fetus is a
person, the appointment of a guardian ad litem is inappropriate in
compelled medical treatment cases. No court would mandate the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for a child in need of an organ
190. Some commentators have called for the appointment of guardians ad litem for the fetus
to assist in a judicial determination of whether "the benefit to the fetus from the intervention
outweighs the harm to the woman of the coerced intrusion." See Robertson, Legal Issues in
Fetal Therapy, 9 SEMINARS PERINATOLOGY 136, 141 (1985) [hereinafter Legal Issues].
Robertson would not, however, undertake this type of balancing when an embryo was involved;
nor would he call for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in those cases, because he does not
believe the embryo has protectable rights. See Robertson, The Legal Status of Early Embryos
(Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Rights), 76 VA. L. REV. 435 (1990). One Note
advocates a guardian ad litem be appointed "to represent to a court the best course of conduct
for protecting the fetus." Note, Maternal Substance Abuse The Need To Provide Legal
Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1230 (1987).
191. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
192. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
193. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAs, supra note 38, at 204-09; Field, supra note 185, at 119 n.47. If
liability were imposed for exposure to risks early in the pregnancy, the potential for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem to monitor possible pregnancies becomes much more likely.
194. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
195. Pollitt notes that fetal right advocates grant rights to the fetus that an existing child
cannot claim: "the right, for example, to a safe, healthy place to live." Pollitt, supra note 185, at
414.
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donation from a parent, nor would the court ever require such a
donation. 96
Appointing guardians for fetuses or embryos creates the following
paradox: a woman may legally choose to have an abortion, yet if she
chooses to carry the child to term a guardian may be appointed to
represent the unborn child's interests against hers. Professor John
Robertson posits that when a woman "decides to forgo abortion and
the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman loses the liberty to
act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus."' 197 Contrary to
Robertson's beliefs, such duties are properly viewed as moral obliga-
tions, but cannot create legal obligations without incurring unaccept-
able costs to the civil liberties of women. Although society may view
the woman as having moral obligations to the developing fetus, this
should not automatically translate into the imposition of legal obliga-
tions.1 98 The Supreme Court has held that a husband may not veto an
196. See, e.g., McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978) (cousin could not be compelled to
undergo bone marrow transplant testing despite being the only compatible donor).
197. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth,
69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437 (1983) [hereinafter Procreative Liberty]. Robertson views the imposition
of these obligations as an appropriate use of the law, although he does not favor criminal
penalties and incarceration of pregnant women. See, e.g., id.; Legal Issues, supra note 190, at 141;
Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 357-59
(1982). Robertson does not believe these obligations extend to embryos not yet implanted, nor
does he believe any obligations foreclose the woman's right to an abortion.
198. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court Ordered Cesareans,
74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1980-81 (1986):
[Iln this very private and bodily sphere, the issue of moral obligations, even very
compelling ones, must be kept distinct from the issue of legal coercion of individuals to meet
their moral obligations. The law of rescue condones many omissions that are morally
reprehensible. For that matter, refusal to undertake risky rescues does not normally even
invoke moral opprobrium. Morally, we seem to have a different standard for pregnant
women. But this moral standard does not justify an unparalleled level of legal constraint.
Pollitt challenges Robertson's notion that by affirmatively deciding to keep pregnancies women
incur legal duties. For some individuals, true choice is not available-they are addicted, poor, or
lack access to abortions. In addition, according to Pollitt, even choosing to become and remain
pregnant should not result in a forfeiture of rights.
Why should pregnant women be barred from considering their own interests? It is, after all,
what parents do all the time. The model of women's relation to the fetus proposed by the
duty of care ethicists is an abstraction that ignores the realities of life even when they affect
the fetus itself. In real life, for instance, to quit one's dangerous job means to lose one's
health insurance, thus exposing the fetus to another set of risks.
Pollitt, supra note 185, at 415. Nolan discusses moral obligations to avoid prenatal harm, and the
intersection of legal and moral obligations:
While some might argue that a woman has no legal obligation to change any of her behav-
iors simply because she has become pregnant, it is less clear that this argument would extend
to the level of morality. A woman's claim to act as she chooses (based on the principle of
autonomy) appears to be legitimately constrained (morally) by her relation to a fetus in an
ongoing pregnancy, although it is important to note that this constraint is based on her
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abortion.199 The courts have rejected appeals by intervenors on behalf
of fetuses in the abortion context on the ground that fetuses are not
persons under the fourteenth amendment.2 °° That reasoning pre-
cludes the appointment of guardians ad litem for fetuses.2 °1 Although
previous attempts to represent the fetus in abortion cases have failed,
broadening fetal rights by appointing fetal guardians in other contexts
will renew these attempts, result in unduly burdening those private
decisions, and have a chilling effect on a woman's right to have an
abortion.
Under Roe v. Wade, it is inappropriate to appoint fetal guardians ad
litem in cases concerning statutes that restrict minors' access to abor-
tion services but that provide a judicial bypass around the restrictions.
The fetus does not have interests to be considered in determining
whether abortion should be available to a minor without parental con-
sent.2"2 Appointing a guardian ad litem would also seriously infringe
a woman's privacy rights. Furthermore, it would congest court dock-
ets with cases not properly amenable to judicial resolution.2 °3
freely choosing to be in relationship to a dependent other. If women are unable to choose
not to conceive or not to remain pregnant, then the involuntary nature of their relationship
changes its moral character.
Nolan, supra note 93, at 18. The existence of moral obligations to the fetus does not necessarily
mandate the imposition of legal obligations. Id. at 20-21. For a discussion of the intersection of
morality, rights and law, see, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOuSLY 232-78 (rev. ed.
1978); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981). A number of scholars
have posited that men and women engage in different processes of moral reasoning that result in
different outcomes. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 18-23 (1982) (context and relationships form the core of a woman's
moral reasoning, which leads to a moral view emphasizing responsibilities rather than rights and
autonomy).
199. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
200. "The law is clear that an unborn child is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and therefore the unborn child and persons acting in behalf of
an unborn child may not assert the deprivation of any rights or privileges secured by the
Amendment." Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379, 1382-83 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd mem. in
part, 516 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). Therefore, no
protection is available to the fetus on § 1983 grounds. Ruiz Romero v. Gonzales Caraballo, 681
F. Supp. 123 (D.P.R. 1988), Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981); Poole, 371 F.
Supp. at 1382-83. Section 1983 provides for suits when individuals acting under color of state
law deprive persons of rights protected by the Constitution and federal laws. 42 USC § 1983.
201. Appointing a guardian ad litem for the fetus would amount to recognizing juridical
status for the fetus, which courts have generally declined to do in this context.
202. T.W. Brief, supra note 138, at 2.
203. The courtroom is a poor place to debate such intensely private and highly individualized
issues as the proper approach to prenatal care and the decision whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy.
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As the privacy and liberty doctrines encompass more than just abor-
tion rights,2" the further undermining, even the overruling, of Roe
would not legitimate the appointment of fetal guardians ad litem; the
practice would still violate privacy principles. The privacy doctrine is
grounded in the premise that bodily integrity and personal decision-
making should be protected from intrusive state action.20 5 Appointing
a guardian ad litem who could call into question the decisions made by
a woman during pregnancy would violate the most basic premises of
the privacy doctrine.
B. The Child Abuse and Neglect Cases
As currently written, most child abuse and neglect acts do not pro-
vide a basis for protecting fetuses and embryos through the vehicle of
the guardian ad litem. The statutory language generally indicates that
such legislation was not intended to protect fetuses or embryos. The
statutes usually contain definitional language that identifies children as
persons under a specified age, usually eighteen years old.20 6 Under
204. See supra notes 113, 134-36 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 113-136 and accompanying text.
206. Several state legislatures have recently sought to bring fetuses (and potentially embryos)
into the scope of their child abuse acts by amending them to include prenatal exposure to drugs
within the definition of neglect. In Colorado, the state senate considered and reported without
recommendation a bill that would include substance abuse during pregnancy within the
definition of child abuse. See The Alan Guttmacher Institute, State Reproductive Health
Monitor: Legislative Proposals and Actions 79 (Issue III, Sept. 1990). In Montana, the state
senate introduced a bill that would call for the public health division to appoint a guardian ad
litem where a pregnant woman is reported to be chemically dependant and refuses to accept or is
unamenable to treatment. Id. at 83. In Minnesota, the senate introduced and reported favorably
upon a bill that specifies that exposing an unborn to nonmedically used controlled substances is
child neglect. Id. at 82. In Maryland, the senate passed a bill altering the definition of the word
"neglect" in its child neglect statute to include the use of controlled substances by a pregnant
woman resulting in prenatal fetal exposure. Id. In Georgia, the state house judiciary committee
introduced a bill making it a crime to "distribute" controlled substances to a fetus. Id. at 80. In
addition, some state legislators have sought to expand criminal statutes to proscribe prenatal
substance abuse. Legislation before the Illinois legislature entitled "Conduct Injurious to a
Newborn" would make it a felony for a woman:
who knowingly or intentionally uses a dangerous drug or narcotic drug and at the
conclusion of her pregnancy delivers a newborn child, and such child shows signs of
narcotic or dangerous drug exposure or addiction, or the presence of a narcotic or
dangerous drug in the child's blood or urine, commits the offense of conduct injurious to a
newborn.
Ill. H. 2835, 86th Gen. Assembly (1989-1990) (amending ch. 38 by adding § 12-4.7). The pen-
alty for conviction of this class four felony ranges from probation to a three-year prison term.
Defenses to the charge include lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or entry into a medical treat-
ment program for substance abuse, with a discontinuation of drug use. Id.; see Logli, Drugs in
the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 27-28 (1990).
All of these revisions address toxicological findings in existing children, and use that as evidence
of abuse or neglect to determine whether state intervention should occur. However, it is unclear
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current law, the fetus is not a person."' Courts are required to give
effect to the plain meaning of the statutory language.2 "8 Given the
definitional sections of the statutes and the historical interpretation of
the word "child,"20 9 it is clear that a fetus is not part of the protected
class.
Applying the statutory mechanism to protect fetuses implicates pri-
vacy issues not contemplated by the enactors of the child protection
statutes. Although a state's interest in protecting children may at
times require infringing upon a parent's decisions about child care, it
does not rise to the level contemplated by the protection of a fetus or
embryo. There is a qualitative difference between the infringement of
a mother's autonomy to protect an existing child and restricting the
autonomy of a pregnant woman in order to protect a fetus.210 Existing
children are separate entities, and protecting them does not require
invading the personal physical autonomy and privacy of another indi-
vidual. Although the parens patriae powers of the state over living
children may sometimes operate to restrict the autonomy of par-
ents,211 the exercise of these powers does not concomitantly invade
their privacy over choices concerning their own persons.
Appointing guardians ad litem for fetuses treats pregnant women as
little more than fetal containers,2 12 and undermines a woman's posi-
whether drug use during pregnancy automatically guarantees parental unfitness after birth. See
Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1519, 1575 &
n.124 (1990). Myers argues that existing statutes can be construed to include fetuses because the
statutes contain only an upper age limitation. See Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can
the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 26 (1984).
207. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
208. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916).
209. Most state statutes define "child" as "a person under the age of eighteen." See, eg., 19
COLO. REv. STAT. § 1-103 (1987).
210. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1023 (1984):
Fetal life is starkly different from all other forms of human life in that the fetus is completely
dependent upon the body of the woman who conceived it. It cannot survive without her.
Although all human infants, and many adults, are dependent upon others for survival, that
support can be provided by many people. The fetus by contrast is dependent upon a
particular woman.
Law discusses this dependency in the context of a woman's right to abortion.
211. "Parents engage in a broad range of conduct, from passive neglect to physical abuse, that
may, according to some admittedly subjective measure, depart from an ideal family situation.
Nevertheless, states have been extremely reluctant to remove children from homes that depart
from this subjective ideal .... Note, supra note 145, at 1336.
212. See Annas, Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13 (1986);
Rhoden, supra note 198, at 1968. Cases initiated after the birth of a child have used maternal
conduct during pregnancy as evidence of unfitness in termination of parental rights cases.
However, the issue in those cases is whether the individual is fit to be a parent to an existing child
and the inquiries have focused in that direction. See In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293
N.W.2d 736 (1980); In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
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tion as a competent, independent individual. The appointment of a
guardian ad litem would force a woman to justify her conduct to
another individual, potentially compelling her to divulge intimate and
private details of her life. This information might encompass informa-
tion about diet, including consumption of caffeine, alcohol, sulfites,
fats and sugars; her levels of exercise, weight gain and sexual activity;
her work conditions and home environment; her use of seatbelts; her
use of plane travel; and other details of ordinary life that could affect
fetal development. The guardian would be empowered to argue before
the court that a woman's behavior was potentially detrimental to the
fetus and should be restricted or prohibited. If the argument was suc-
cessful, the guardian ad litem would potentially have the power to sub-
stitute his or her judgment regarding the propriety of engaging in these
activities for the judgment of the woman concerned. A greater intru-
sion into the protected realms of privacy and bodily autonomy is diffi-
cult to imagine.
The Missouri abortion regulation statute which was at issue in Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services213 proclaims in its preamble that
"[t]he life of each human being, begins at conception" and that
"unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-
being." '214 The statute further declares that Missouri state laws are to
be interpreted to afford the same rights to the fetus as to other persons,
subject to the Constitution.2" 5 The Webster plurality found the pream-
ble to be acceptable as an expression of the state's value judgment
favoring life.216 The potential ramifications of this state pronounce-
ment are enormous.217 If the status of personhood begins at concep-
tion, a guardian ad litem would have to be appointed in each instance
where the conduct of the woman or those around her implicated "fetal
rights." '218 The preamble is tempered by the statement that these
rights and privileges are subject to constitutional law and Supreme
Court precedent. 219 Given that current constitutional law explicitly
213. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
214. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986).
215. Id. § 1.205.2.
216. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050. Because it "does not by its terms regulate abortion or any
other aspect of appellees' medical practice," the preamble was viewed as having no substantive
effect on a woman's right to have an abortion. Id.
217. The preamble may, for instance, affect access to certain forms of contraceptives,
application of criminal trespass statutes to anti-abortion protesters, interpretation of under-age
drinking regulations, unlawful imprisonment of fetuses and appointment of guardians ad litem.
For a general discussion of these possibilities, see Johnsen, supra note 183, at 180-86.
218. The appointment of a guardian ad litem would embody the court's view that a fetus is a
person, a notion the woman may not share.
219. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2.
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holds that the fetus is not a person, it is difficult to know exactly what
to make of the preamble.2 20 If given force, the preamble would effec-
tively override the rights of pregnant women by conferring the status
of legal personhood on the fetus.2 21 Although a later section of the
preamble222 attempts to minimize the potential impact on pregnant
women by stating that no cause of action for indirect fetal harm from
maternal failure to obtain prenatal care should be inferred, the ramifi-
cations of this statute typify the dangers inherent in treating fetuses as
if they were legally equivalent to persons.22 3
If affirmative obligations are imposed on pregnant women to pre-
vent them from engaging in conduct that might damage a fetus,
fetuses would effectively receive greater protection than do existing
children. For example, a fetal guardian could be appointed whenever
there is a risk of harm to the fetus because a woman is using drugs; by
contrast, a guardian ad litem is ordinarily appointed in child abuse
cases only after a child has suffered actual harm. 24 This distinction is
difficult to reconcile with the fact that appointing fetal guardians ad
litem results in a much greater imposition on privacy than does the
appointment of guardians ad litem for children.
The difficulty of ascertaining the "best interests" of a fetus or
embryo will endow a fetal guardian ad litem with the authority to take
actions to protect fetuses and embryos based on that guardian's subjec-
tive notions of what constitutes appropriate behavior. In the case of
children, courts determine the best interests of a separate and pres-
ently existing life. The numerous complications inherent in ascertain-
220. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). "The [Webster] court did not acknowledge the
absurdity of interpreting the expansive language of the declaration-which by its express terms
grants fetuses legal personhood under other Missouri laws- to exclude the very abortion
restrictions with which it was enacted." Johnsen, supra note 183, at 182.
221. Johnsen, supra note 183, at 189.
222. "Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a
woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or by
failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care." Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.4.
223. "Although this provision may protect women from being sued by their children for
acting 'negligently' during pregnancy, the declaration that life begins at conception nonetheless
threatens women with other forms of government interference that is ostensibly aimed at
'protecting' fetuses from the women who bear them." Johnsen, supra note 183, at 189-90. It
appears from the language of the section that in the future some type of direct harm might be
open to prosecution under the statute. The statutory language is silent on the question of
whether a woman who acts recklessly or engages in conduct that is grossly negligent may be
liable for such actions.
224. "While drug use may expose a fetus to risk; harm occurs only in a proportion of cases.
The fetus is also at risk from other factors. Child abuse intervention ordinarily occurs only when
a child has suffered real injury." Mariner, supra note 18, at 35.
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ing the best interests of living individuals in a pluralistic society22 5
would only be magnified if applied to a fetus or embryo.226 Tradi-
tional notions of erring on the side of life may be inappropriate when a
fetus or embryo is involved. Courts recognize that a competent adult
has a right to refuse treatment, even if the refusal will result in
death.22 7 Implicit in this legal affirmation of the right to reject treat-
ment is the recognition that individuals may decide that the quality of
their life no longer makes it worth living, and that the discontinuation
of treatment may be in a person's best interests.22 8 Is this concept one
which should be applied to the fetus or embryo? Always favoring life
for the fetus, even if that life will be short and painful, might be inap-
propriate and cruel. It would be extremely difficult at best for the
guardian to ascertain what the "best interests" of the fetus or embryo
would be in these circumstances. A guardian ad litem might not take
into account the possibility of an "altruistic" fetus or embryo, one that
225. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and By What Standards?, 41
RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 521 (1989).
226. "Unconceived children cannot be asked whether they would prefer not to be conceived
in light of any risks .... " Peters, Protecting the Unconceived: Nonexistence, Avoidability and
Reproductive Technology, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 487, 499 (1989). Peters poses a second concern:
"whether society can owe a duty to the unconceived not to harm them. Duties not to harm
persons seem to presuppose their existence." Id. at 500.
227. The recently decided case of Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990), assumed that there is a constitutional right to refuse treatment. The clearly expressed
wishes of a competent adult govern treatment decisions. When an individual in a persistent
vegetative state leaves no clear indication of whether he or she would wish to discontinue
nutrition and hydration prior to becoming incapacitated, the state may assert a supervening
authority to preserve life, and refuse to allow family members to make decisions to terminate
treatment. See id. at 2854-55.
228. See Pollock, supra note 225, at 521. The judiciary has, in the past, held as an underlying
premise the principle that life is always better than nonexistence. This principle has led most
courts to reject wrongful life claims. Wrongful life claims are brought by children born after
erroneous prenatal diagnosis, or failed sterilizations. See generally Fain, Wrongful Life: Legal
and Medical Aspects, 75 KY. L.J. 585 (1986-1987). Courts are reluctant to recognize such claims
in part because of the preference for life, and in part because of the difficulty in assessing damages
given the inherent value attached to life. Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341, 352 (1986)
("The notion that nonexistence may be preferable to life with severe birth defects appears to
contravene the policy favoring the 'preciousness and sanctity of human life.' "); see also Furrow,
Diminished Lives and Malpractice: Courts in Transition, LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 100
(1982). However, the establishment of the constitutional right to die implicitly recognizes that in
some circumstances death is preferable to life. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 4916 (1990) (recognizing
a constitutional right to die, but allowing to stand Missouri's rejection of parental right to
terminate treatment when the parents could not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
incompetent woman had articulated her preference to die). Living wills are another example of
state recognition that individual preferences regarding when life is no longer worth living should
be legally binding. See, e.g., Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186-7195
(West Supp. 1977). Individuals may write living wills because they do not wish to live in certain
circumstances, and because they do not wish to put their families through the painful, emotional
and expensive care of a declining individual.
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would sacrifice its potential existence to promote the life or health of
another.229 Moreover, a guardian ad litem advocating the "best inter-
ests of the fetus" might advocate confinement of the pregnant woman,
thereby relegating the woman's rights to second class status. Such
confinement, moreover, might be of dubious benefit to the fetus.23°
Determining what types of behavior by pregnant women should
trigger the appointment of a fetal guardian will lead courts into impos-
sible conundrums. The questions that would need to be answered are
innumerable. How would the conduct necessitating the appointment
of a guardian ad litem be defined? Who would have standing to call
for such an appointment? While most would agree that illegal sub-
stance abuse is potentially harmful to a fetus and should be proscribed,
once courts engage the issue it would be logically difficult to justify
failing to prohibit all conduct which may injure a fetus. Appointing a
guardian ad litem might be justified if a woman smoked, ate "junk
food," failed to seek prenatal care, engaged in strenuous exercise,
worked in a hazardous environment, engaged in sexual activity when
contraindicated, breathed polluted air, or lived near electric force
fields or toxic waste sites. Criminalizing any or all these forms of con-
229. For a discussion of behavior in gift giving and the implications for the formal legal rules
governing such behavior, see Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 172-79 (1989).
The premise that individuals need protection from rashly parting with their possessions is based
on a belief that individuals are basically self-interested. Baron points out that empirical evidence
derived from kidney donation studies indicates that the basic assumption is questionable. Id. at
174. If existing individuals are allowed to act out of selfless motivation, why should a fetus or
embryo be precluded from doing so?. For a general discussion of altruistic behavior, see
ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES (J. Rushton & R. Sorrentino eds. 1981); ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY, AND HELPING:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES (L. Wispe ed. 1978).
In the trust context, representation of the unborn may present problems with modification of
the trust. See Bird, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living, and Dead Hands-Too Many Fingers in
the Trust Pie, 36 HASTINGS LJ. 563 (1985). Bird notes that "nonpecuniary factors, such as
familial devotion [may be] a substitute for consideration" in trust termination cases. Id. at 605.
She notes that legislation in Wisconsin allows for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
represent unborn or unascertained beneficiaries and provides that "[a] guardian ad litem for such
beneficiary may rely on general family benefit accruing to living members of the beneficiary's
family as a basis for approving a revocation, modification or termination of a trust or any part
thereof." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.12(2) (West 1981); Bird, supra, at 605, n.247. Applying this
approach to the issue at hand, a guardian ad litem mikht not be able to take into account familial
circumstances and advocate embryonic nonexistence in order to benefit existing family members.
230. Confinement in prison is a questionable means of ensuring healthy babies born of healthy
women, as prenatal care might not be as readily available in prisons. Moreover, dietary, exercise
and other restraints present in prison might actually harm the fetus. In addition, there are
reports of rampant drug use in the prison system. See McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health,
Policy, and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (1987-1988); Malcolm, Explosive Drug Use Creating New
Underworld in Prisons, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
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duct in the case of pregnant women--conduct that is otherwise legal-
is highly problematic, and potentially counterproductive, to say noth-
ing of invasive.
These issues illustrate the quandary that would be faced by a guard-
ian ad litem charged with representing a fetus or embryo. The
answers to these questions depend on one's individual moral and ethi-
cal views, rather than on objective legal principles. The answers,
therefore, will vary from individual to individual. No objectively neu-
tral and generally acceptable legal standards can be ascertained, set, or
enforced to define the powers and responsibilities of fetal guardians.
As long as the pregnant woman and the fetus she carries are physio-
logically united, such intervention subordinates the woman to the
fetus."' Civil intervention in child abuse and neglect proceedings ini-
tially aims to provide support services and guidance to keep families
together.2 32 As a last resort, a child may be removed from parental
custody, because the child is a physically separate person. "Fetal
abuse," however, cannot be prevented without actual physical inter-
vention against the pregnant woman or, at the least, serious restric-
tions on her liberty.
VII. RAMIFICATIONS OF APPOINTING FETAL
GUARDIANS AD LITEM
Appointing guardians ad litem to represent the interests of fetuses in
legal proceedings concerning forced medical treatment, drug prosecu-
tions and prenatal abuse and neglect, is unwarranted and inappropri-
ate. It is tantamount to punishing "the status of being pregnant,
[which] is likely to profoundly affect the way society views women in
general and to transform pregnant women from nurturers into
suspects." '233
A. Drug Prosecution and Forced Medical Treatments
Supporters of the notion of fetal guardians argue that they are con-
cerned only with women who subject the fetuses they carry to
extreme hazards by their conduct. 3 Generally, this behavior
231. Id.
232. See generally Mariner, supra note 18, at 35.
233. Id. at 32. The appointment of the guardian ad litem in these cases removes
decisionmaking authority and autonomy from the woman, and restricts her behavior as well.
The appointment is therefore both a restriction on liberty and a punishment for activities deemed
inappropriate.
234. See, e.g., Rickhoff & Cukjati, Protecting the Fetus from Maternal Drug and Alcohol
Abuse: A Proposal for Texas, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 266 (1989) [hereinafter Rickhoffl.
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involves the use of illicit substances, "the failure to take medication for
mental health needs or engaging in physical acts likely to cause fetal
injury with long-term consequences." '235 While these advocates con-
tend they are not endorsing proscription of "all maternal conduct that
affects, even tangentially, the health of the developing fetus,"' 236 draw-
ing the line between prohibited and permitted behavior is treacherous.
Defining conduct which "poses a substantial risk of severe impairment
or death to the fetus" is extremely problematic.237 For example,
Rickhoff and Cukjati expressly disavow any desire to regulate "caf-
feine, nicotine or social drinking, ' 238 but medical studies indicate that
these legal substances and activities may also have severe adverse
impacts on the fetus.
Prosecutions of pregnant women cannot rationally be limited to illegal
conduct because many legal behaviors cause damage to developing
babies. Women who are diabetic or obese, women with cancer or epi-
lepsy who need drugs that could harm the fetus, women who are too
poor to eat adequately or to get prenatal care could all be characterized
as fetal abusers. 3
Drawing the line poses a real obstacle to regulating the conduct of
240pregnant women.
Recognizing the interests of what Professor Charo calls the "phan-
tom fetus" threatens to create second class citizenship for all women
235. Id.
236. Id. at 300.
237. Id; see also In re Fletcher, 141 Misc. 2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (Fain. Ct. 1988)
(finding prenatal substance abuse could not be the basis for finding of child abuse or neglect):
[n]o authority [exists] for the State to regulate women's bodies merely because they are
pregnant. By becoming pregnant, women do not waive the constitutional protections
afforded to other citizens. To carry the Law Guardian's argument to its logical extension,
the State would be able to supersede a mother's custody right to her child if she smoked
cigarettes during her pregnancy, or ate junk food, or did too much physical labor or did not
exercise enough. The list of potential intrusions is long and constitute [sic] entirely
unacceptable violations of the bodily integrity of women.
238. Rickhoff, supra note 234, at 266.
239. Paltrow, supra note 188, at 42.
240. Appointing fetal guardians is problematic also because it has racial and class
implications. National surveys indicate that women of color and poor women are the primary
victims of prosecutions for drug use during pregnancy and for compelled obstetrical
interventions. See Chasnoff, The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and
Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202
(1990) (finding that black women were reported at ten times the rate of white women, despite the
fact that there were few differences between races in the rate of substance abuse during
pregnancy); Kolder, supra note 142, at 1195 (finding that forced medical treatment of pregnant
women was primarily directed against poor women and women of color); see also L. Paltrow, H.
Fox & E. Goetz, ACLU Memorandum: Overview of ACLU National Survey of Criminal
Prosecutions Brought Against Pregnant Women: 80% Brought Against Women of Color 2 (May
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of childbearing age, while failing to achieve the desired end of protect-
ing the health of fetus and woman."' Increasing the availability and
accessibility of treatment programs and prenatal care-not the threat
of sanctions and prosecutions-is a more rational and responsible
approach to benefiting fetal and maternal health.242
As a responsible society, our desire to minimize health risks to the
unborn child should be tempered by the recognition that maximizing
7, 1990) (on file with the Washington Law Review) ("[R]acial and ethnic bias play a significant
role in determining who is reported to authorities and who is punished.").
Recognizing fetal interests, and therefore by inference requiring the appointment of fetal
guardians ad litem, also raises equal protection issues. "[A]ny governmental action that singles
out women for special penalties solely because they become pregnant discriminates on the basis
of gender." Paltrow, supra note 188, at 45; see also Mariner, supra note 18, at 40 n.37. While
some of the conduct at issue, like use of illegal drugs, is regulated or proscribed for all
individuals, many of the potential prohibitions would affect only pregnant women. Consumption
of alcoholic beverages, for example, is conduct that is not regulated in non-pregnant adults, but
that would be subject to regulation under some views of maternal duties to fetuses. Other
conduct that might be subject to such intervention includes cigarette smoking and use of
prescription drugs and therapies.
The decisions in question here-what to eat or drink, when to go to the doctor, whether to
have sex ... have both procreative and non-procreative aspects. Indeed, regulating such
decisions for all people... has no procreative significance. If states limit consumption only
for pregnant women, however, they would be regulating the procreative aspect of the
decision whether to drink. Such laws seek to control the incidents of procreation, infringing
on a woman's power to make decisions about how she will live her life during her
pregnancy.
Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of Fetal Abuse,
101 HARV. L. REV. 995, 1000 (1988); see also Johnsen, supra note 183, at 200 n.73. Johnsen
notes that the consequences of these "virtually unlimited" special restrictions would be "treating
pregnant women as less than full legal persons." Id. at 200. The fact that the conduct involved
does not in and of itself implicate fundamental rights is irrelevant. "This analysis ignores the
critical fact that the constitutionally suspect governmental action that triggers heightened scru-
tiny is the imposition of additional burdens on women solely on the basis of their reproductive
capacity." Id. This type of differentiation is an impermissible violation of the equal protection
clause.
241. The term "phantom fetus" was coined by R. Alta Charo. Remarks at the Health Law
Teacher's Conference (June 1990). Charo is extremely disturbed by instances in which fetuses
and prospective fetuses are given protections greater than those afforded to existing people,
usually at the expense of existing women. The concerns include exclusion from workplace due to
potential hazards, withholding of the abortifacient RU-486, forced cesarians and prosecutions of
pregnant women.
242. The fact that prenatal care is not universally available to pregnant women undercuts the
argument that societal interests in the welfare of children and the unborn are always viewed as
primary. In addition, treatment programs for substance abusers rarely address the needs of
pregnant women, and often do not admit pregnant women. Mariner, supra note 18 at 36. The
Chavkin survey indicated that 54% of drug programs in New York City refused pregnant
women. A Massachusetts study indicates that only 30 beds in residential treatment programs in
the state are available to women, fifteen of which are in correctional facilities. Chavkin, Drug
Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 483 (1990).
President Bush's veto of the Family Leave Act may indicate that comprehensive approaches to
benefitting fetal and maternal health do not have institutional governmental support.
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that goal at the expense of goals of autonomy and privacy may not be
advisable. Valuing a potential individual's health more highly than
the rights of an existing individual by regulating conduct that is unreg-
ulated when pregnancy is not at issue in effect assigns a higher value to
the potential life and health of a fetus than to the rights of pregnant
women.
The specter of "pregnancy police"'243 deciding when a woman has
breached a particular standard of conduct might well produce unin-
tended adverse consequences for both woman and fetus. If women
fear prosecution, confinement, or the appointment of another person
to dictate their behavior and to represent the interests of the fetus they
are carrying against their own, they may rationally avoid contact with
individuals they perceive as having the power to report them. Conse-
quently, women who need prenatal care the most may refuse to seek
it.244 Lack of prenatal care may be far more detrimental to the health
of a woman and fetus than the questionable conduct of the woman.245
B. Reproductive Technologies Cases
Appointing guardians ad litem for fetuses poses the difficult prob-
lem of determining when fetal rights accrue, the resolution of which
turns on moral, philosophical and religious premises. The Louisiana
Civil Code regulations on human embryos state that:
[ain in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person until such
time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any
other time when such rights attach to an unborn child in accordance
with law.246 In disputes arising between any parties regarding the in
vitro fertilized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such disputes is
to be in the best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum.24 7
243. McNulty, supra note 230, at 277.
244. As Senator Herb Kohl stated at Congressional hearings on prenatal substance abuse,
"[Miothers-afraid of criminal prosecution-fail to seek the very prenatal care that could help
their babies and them." Paltrow, supra note 188, at 44 (citing Senate Hearings, supra note 188,
at 5 (opening statement of Sen. Herb Kohl)). The statement typifies the experience of other
health care workers. See Paltrow, supra note 188, at 44 (citing Affidavit of Ira J. Chasnoff, M.D.,
submitted in support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss Indictment, People v. Hardey, No. 87-
2931-87 (Mich. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 1989)).
245. Drug use may be only one factor in a number of potential risks to the fetus. "Drug use
goes hand-in-hand with inadequate nutrition, poor prenatal care, and poorly timed pregancies."
Nolan, supra note 93, at 19 (1990). Inadequate prenatal care is often associated with low birth
weight, a major risk factor in infant mortality. Mariner, supra note 18, at 33.
246. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West Supp. 1990). However, section 133 indicates no
inheritance rights attach until a live birth occurs.
247. Id. § 9:131.
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This language calls for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
ensure that the interests of the fertilized ovum are adequately repre-
sented. A number of questions are left unanswered by the statute.
Would a guardian ad litem be appointed each time the implantation
process was commenced, and would a different guardian be required
for each embryo? If cryopreservation were contemplated, would a
guardian ad litem have to assent to the freezing? If the donation of
embryos were being considered by a couple, should the embryo be rep-
resented?248 In divorce cases, when disputes arise as to whether a fer-
tilized ovum should be thawed or implanted, should a guardian ad
litem be appointed to assist in the determination of what is in the best
interests of the frozen embryo? The answers to these questions will
ultimately express the moral views of the guardian ad litem or the
judge rather than reflect a neutral, objectively ascertainable rule about
what would best serve the interests of the embryo. Such delicate
moral and personal decisions are not properly amenable to legislative
or judicial resolution; they are best left to the individuals most directly
involved.
In the recent case of Davis v. Davis,249 the trial court stated that
"human life begins at conception." The court went on to use the "best
interests of the child or children, in vitro" standard to find that cus-
tody of in vitro embryos should be granted to the woman.2
Although the court used the parens patriae doctrine in its determina-
tion that it was in the "best interest of the children, in vitro, that they
be made available for implantation to assure their opportunity for live
birth," the court did not appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
those interests.251 On appeal, the decision was reversed and "joint
control" of the embryos was granted to the couple.25 2
248. The Louisiana Code does state that "parental" rights can be renounced in favor of
another married couple, as long as adoption of the in vitro fertilized ovum occurs and a child is
later born. Id. § 130.
249. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097, (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), reversed, No. 180 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept 13, 1990). In a case involving conflicts between the gestational mother and the
couple who had their embryo implanted in the surrogate, the court appointed a guardian ad litem
to represent the interests of the fetus. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 10, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 2, (discussing
Johnson v. Calvert, No. 633190 (Orange County Super. Ct. 1990)). The suit was filed August 13,
1990, a month before the birth of the child. On October 22, 1990, the court ordered custody of
the child to the genetic parents. Gewertz, Genetic Parents Win Sole Custody in Surrogate Case,
L.A. Times, October 23, 1990. L.A. Times Part I col. 5.
250. Davis, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2097, 2097.
251. Id. at 2104.
252. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, slip op. 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept 13, 1990). The court pointed
out that under the Roe approach, "as embryos develop, they are accorded more respect than
mere human cells because of their burgeoning potential for life. But, even after viability, they are
not given the legal status equivalent to that of a person already born." Id. at 5.
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If the Davis court had found it necessary to appoint a guardian ad
litem, separate guardians would have been required to represent the
competing interests of each individual embryo, since in principle par-
ties must be separately represented when their interests are potentially
at odds.253 Because the implantation of some embryos might reduce
the chances of success for others, the embryos might have competing
interests. Courts would be forced to reconcile these competing
interests.
Another difficult issue is the extent to which an embryo's rights
should be preserved by its guardian. For example, could a guardian
for one embryo forego or delay the opportunity for implantation in
order to increase the chances for another's success, even if such action
might decrease the chances of the embryo represented by that guard-
ian? If after the successful implantation of several embryos, attempts
were made to reduce the number of embryos, would guardians ad
litem have to be appointed before a determination was made as to
whether to abort and which fetuses should be aborted? If so, would
the medical judgment of the woman and her doctor be subject to oppo-
sition and review by a guardian ad litem? If a guardian ad litem is
appointed because the embryo has juridical status, should the courts
view the "best interests of the embryo" separately from the rights and
interests of the prospective parents? If "parents" no longer wish to
pursue implantation, does the guardian ad litem, as representative of
the embryo, have the right to petition the court to force implantation
or require donation to a couple who will pursue implantation? In the
case of Davis v. Davis,254 the trial judge found that under parens
patriae, the best interests of these embryos required custody be given
to the "mother" so that she could have the embryos implanted.255
However, in the Davis case, Mary Sue Davis had previously undergone
several unsuccessful attempts at implantation.256 Since the chances of
success with these embryos is unlikely, could a guardian ad litem call
for implantation in a more promising candidate?
Legislation purporting to confer the status of persons on embryos
and fetuses raises all the preceding issues, without providing guidelines
for resolving them. Current voluntary guidelines for in vitro fertiliza-
tion centers provide a better answer. The American Fertility Society
maintains that the products of in vitro fertilization are property which
should be treated with respect, but not given the rights and protections
253. See e-g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
254. 15 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 2098.
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of existing individuals.2 57 Gametes and concepti should be the prop-
erty of the donors. Pre-treatment agreements rather than judicially
imposed standards based on the elusive "best interest" of an embryo
should govern disputes. Such an approach avoids the problems inher-
ent in according embryos separate legal status and rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Guardians ad litem should not be appointed for fetuses or embryos.
First, as a matter of current constitutional law, these entities are not
persons, and therefore should not be accorded the same protections
enjoyed by existing children. Second, the approach of some courts in
applying standards currently used for the appointment of guardians ad
litem for existing children is inappropriate for fetuses and embryos.
There is no escaping that the fetus resides within a living woman,
whose autonomy and privacy should not be diminished by her preg-
nant condition. Third, as a practical matter, the appointment of
guardians ad litem renders pregnancy an adversarial relationship
between woman and fetus, a phenomenon that is ultimately inimical to
the promotion of the interests of both woman and fetus. Although
promoting healthy babies born of healthy women is a laudable con-
cern, appointing guardians ad litem for fetuses and embryos can, in
the long run, only hinder efforts to promote that goal.
257. American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies,
53 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 17-18 Supp. 2 (1990).
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